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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)0) • 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Appellants Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, The Carter-Reed 
Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell 
K. Friedlander (hereinafter referred to collectively in the singular as "Basic Research") 
appeal from the district court's rulings in favor of Defendant Admiral Insurance 
Company ("Admiral") and against Basic Research on cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The sole issue on summary judgment was whether Admiral had an obligation 
to defend Basic Research in three separate actions (the "Underlying Actions") involving 
claims asserted by customers alleging false advertising in the marketing of a weight loss 
product known as Akavar 20/50 ("Akavar"). Whether Admiral had such a duty to 
defend is the issue for review. 
STANDARD OF RE VIEW 
This appeal presents the issue of interpretation of contracts of insurance. The 
interpretation of a contract is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no 
deference to the district court. Saleh v Farmers Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, f 14, 133 P.3d 
428. 
6 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Basic Research was the defendant in three putative class actions: Pamela Miller, 
et. al v Basic Research, et. al, filed in the United States District Court, District of Utah, < 
Central Division. Case No. 2:07-CV-0087 ("the Miller action"); Mary Tompkins, et al. v 
Basic Research, et al, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of 
i 
Sacramento, Action No. 34-2007-00882581 ("the Tompkins action")1; and Nicole 
Forlenza et al v Dynakor Pharmacol et al filed in the United States District Court, 
Central District of California, Case No.: 2:09-CV-03730 ("the Forlenza action").2 These ( 
Underlying Actions focus on the Underlying Plaintiffs' claim that Basic Research 
advertised its product Akavar which the Plaintiffs purchased based on the alleged 
misrepresentations: "EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT" and "WE 
COULDN'T SAY IT IN PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE." 
i 
Basic Research tendered its defense to Admiral in each of the three cases. 
Admiral has not defended Basic Research. 
I 
1
 The Tompkins action was subsequently removed to federal court and then transferred to 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, where it was then consolidated 
with the Miller action. 
2
 The Miller action, the Tompkins action and the Forlenza action are hereafter referred to * 
collectively as "the Underlying Actions" and their plaintiffs are hereafter referred to as 
"the Underlying Plaintiffs." 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
J. The Underlying Actions 
A. The Miller Action 
1. The Miller action has three class representatives: Pamela Miller, Randy 
Howard and Donna Patterson. In Paragraph 10 of the Miller complaint, Ms. Miller states 
that while conducting an Internet search on nutrition she saw an Internet advertisement 
for Akavar that "professed in bold print that the user could "EAT ALL YOU WANT & 
STILL LOSE WEIGHT..." Miller alleges that based on that advertising, she 
purchased a supply of Akavar. "After 25 days of taking Akavar as directed on the 
package labeling, Ms. Miller gained ten pounds and she ceased using the product." 
[Record on Appeal 803-04.]3 
2. In Paragraph 11 of the Miller complaint, Mr. Howard alleges that after 
seeing an Akavar cardboard point-of-purchase advertising display, he purchased two 
bottles of the product. "After two weeks of taking Akavar as directed on the package 
labeling, without changing his eating habits, Mr. Howard had gained five or six pounds 
and he ceased taking Akavar. [R 804.] 
3. In Paragraph 12 of the Miller Complaint, Ms. Patterson alleges that she saw 
an Akavar advertisement in a national women's magazine that said "EAT ALL YOU 
WANT & STILL LOSE WEIGHT." "Based on this advertising by Basic Research, Ms. 
3
 Admiral shall refer to the portions of the record in Appellant's addendum in the same 
fashion as appellant, i.e., [R 100]. Where the reference is to Admiral's addendum, it will 
be abbreviated [R 100*]. 
8 
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Patterson purchased a supply of Akavar from a General Nutrition Store located in 
Arlington, Virginia, for approximately $40.00. After 30 days of taking Akavar as 
directed on the package labeling, Ms. Patterson had lost no weight, and she ceased using < 
the product." [R 805*.] 
B. The Tompkins Action 
i 
4. Mary Tompkins is the sole named plaintiff in the Tompkins action. She 
alleges in her complaint that she purchased Akavar and that after approximately two 
weeks "of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Tompkins had not lost i 
any weight. She ceased taking the product. [R 911.] In Paragraph 23 of her complaint, 
Tompkins states that "[tjhe core of Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations regarding 
Akavar is summarized in Defendants' slogan 'Eat all you want and still lose weight.'" [R 
914.] 
i 
C. The Forlenza Action 
5. The Forlenza Plaintiffs in the operative complaint with respect to the 
Akavar product were Nicole Forlenza, and Shaiden Monroe. In the complaint, Ms. | 
Forlenza alleges that she purchased Akavar in reliance on representations made in 
marketing material displayed at a Walgreens or GNC store. She took the supplement, 
i 
"but the product has not worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Forlenza has found 
that she has not lost any weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not 
lost any weight without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Forlenza has thus suffered i 
9 
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injury and damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and 
because the product has not worked as advertised." [R1014-15.] 
6. In the Forlenza complaint, Ms. Monroe also alleges that she read and relied 
on marketing materials displayed at a Walgreens or GNC and "consumed the product, but 
the product did not work as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Monroe has found that she 
has not lost any weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not lost any 
weight without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Monroe has thus suffered injury and 
damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and because the 
product has not worked as advertised." [R 1015.] 
77. The Pertinent Provisions of the Admiral Policy 
7. The portion of the Admiral policy4 that provides the "Personal and 
Advertising Injury" coverage is Coverage B. [R 37, R 96*.] For the purposes of the issue 
presented, that coverage contains an insuring agreement, definitions and exclusions. 
Appellant's Opening Brief5 essentially ignores the insuring agreement, even though it 
contains the critical provision for the purposes of determining a "potential for coverage."6 
4
 There are two Admiral policies at issue, Policy CA00001165-01 effective August 20, 
2007 and 2008 [R 29] and Policy CA00001165-02 effective August 20, 2009-2009 
[R88]. The pertinent policy terms are identical as shown by the dual references in this 
section. Accordingly, they are referred to in the singular such as "the Admiral policy" or 
"the Admiral coverage." 
5
 Hereafter abbreviated "AOB." 
6
 As noted in more detail below, the complaint must allege and show the potential that 
something alleged is ultimately covered under the insuring agreement. 
10 
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8. The pertinent portion of the Coverage B Insuring Agreement is: 
COVERAGE B - PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which 
this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the 
insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have 
no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not 
apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense and settle any 
claim or "suit" that may result... 
[R 37, R 96*.][emphasis added.] 
9. The "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" coverage defines "personal and 
advertising injury" as follows: 
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, including 
consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or more of the following 
offenses: 
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment; 
b. Malicious prosecution; 
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the 
right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person 
occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor. 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders 
or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or 
organization's goods, products or services. 
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a 
person's right of privacy; 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in your advertisement." 
[R 47,107.] 
10. The "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" coverage excludes, inter alia, 
coverage for: 
g. Quality Or Performance Of Goods - Failure To Conform To 
Statements 
"[PJersonal and advertising injury" arising out of the failure of goods, 
products or services to conform with any statement of quality or 
performance made in your "advertisement." 
[R38, 97.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Summary of Basic Research's Argument 
Basic Research claims that the portion of the "personal and advertising injury" 
coverage that applies is that which covers the insured's liability for damages because of 
"[t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'." It sets forth four 
different reasons the district court erred in ruling in favor of Admiral. The separately 
stated issues are basically arguments to the effect that the District Court should have 
interpreted the policy in the fashion that Basic Research asserted was correct: Because 
the incriminated statements ("EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT" 
and "WE COULDN'T SAY IT IN PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE") were trademarked by 
Western Holdings, and because similar statements had been used by other entities to 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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advertise weight-loss products, the advertising injury offense of "the use of another's 
advertising idea" provides coverage for the claims in the Underlying Action. 
Accordingly, it is asserts that Admiral had a duty to defend. [AOB 1-2.] 
While the application of Exclusion "g" is not mentioned in Basic Research's 
statement of the "Issues for Review" [AOB 1-2], Basic Research argues in the body of its 
brief that Exclusion "g" is inapplicable because: (i) neither of the alleged 
misrepresentations "provides information about 'the essential or distinctive characteristic, 
property or attribute' of Akavar;" (ii) neither "speaks to the grade, superiority or 
excellence" of Akavar; (iii) and neither "addresses the manner or efficacy, or how Akavar 
'reacts or fulfills its intended purpose.'" [AOB 45-47.]7 
B. Summary of Admiral's Response 
Basic Research, as it did before the district court, proposes parsing the policy 
language beyond the point of reasonableness and in a fashion that ignores the basic nature 
and purpose of liability insurance in general and the terms of the policy in question in 
particular. Specifically, Basic Research ignores the fundamental fact that advertising 
injury liability insurance covers an insured for its liability for damages in actions brought 
by plaintiffs who have been injured by the specific covered offenses defined in the 
policy. As the allegations of the Underlying Complaints show, and the district court 
found, the Underlying Plaintiffs do not claim that they were damaged by Basic 
7
 Exclusion "g" was the basis given by the trial court for granting Admiral's motion for 
summary judgment. Ruling, Page 18. 
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Research's use of the slogans. Rather, they claim to have been injured because the 
slogans for Akavar were not true, because plaintiffs could not "eat all they wanted and 
still lose weight.8 Accordingly, there is no potential for coverage and no obligation to 
defend.9 
Additionally, Admiral contends that what the Underlying Plaintiffs allege is 
specifically addressed in and excluded from coverage by the Admiral Policy's Personal 
and Advertising Injury Exclusion "g." That provision unambiguously states that there is 
no coverage for personal and advertising injury arising out of the failure of the insured's 
goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality or performance 
made in the insured's advertisement. Every single Underlying Plaintiff alleges that he or 
she saw Basic Research's representations, purchased and used Akavar and did not lose 
weight. The clear import of the charges is that Akavar lacked the quality and 
performance represented by Basic Research. 
Because the Underlying Plaintiffs do not allege a covered offense and because the 
policy clearly excludes the type of offense Underlying Plaintiffs do allege, there is no 
8
 The district court stated: 
While Plaintiffs maintain that class action suits were the result of their use 
of the noted slogans, upon review of the complaints it is apparent that the 
basis of the claim against Plaintiffs is the failed promise of weight loss 
without any behavior or lifestyle changes and not the use. of the phrases 
"Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight" and And We Couldn't Say It In 
Print If It Wasn't True" to advertise Akavar. 
Ruling, Page 13 [emphasis that of the court.] 
9
 Lack of coverage under the insuring agreement was the basis of the district court's 
denial of Basic Research's motion for summary judgment. Ruling, Page 17 
14 
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potential for coverage and no duty to defend. Accordingly, the district court judgment 
should be affirmed. 
ADMIRAL'S ARGUMENT 
A. Applicable Insurance Law 
1. Interpretation of Insurance Policies 
Insurance policies are contracts just like any other contracts, and are interpreted 
under general contract principles. See Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37 f^ 
14, 140 P.3d 1210. If the language within the four corners of the contract is
 { 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language. See id . Furthermore, when courts find that the contract language 
is clear they will not give it a strained interpretation to find coverage: 
[A] court [is restrained] from liberally and unreasonably construing an 
insurance contract to permit a strained or unnatural interpretation in order to 
find coverage for innocent victims who are subjects of enormous sympathy. < 
Otherwise, the effect would be to bind the insurer to a risk that was not 
contemplated and for which it was not paid. 
Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Utah 1993) (brackets in 
original). 
In construing a contract, the intention of the parties is controlling. In interpreting a 
contract, the court looks to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and 
considers each contract provision in relation to all others, with a view to giving effect to 
all and ignoring none. See Selvig v. Blockbuster Enterprises, 2011 UT 39, |^23 see also 
Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, % 10, 94 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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P.3d 292. Utah Courts "determine the legal import of insurance policies, affording the 
policy terms their usually accepted meanings and giving effect to harmonizing to the 
extent possible all policy provisions." S. W. Energy v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 UT 23, 
U12, 974 P.2d 1239. 
That the parties have different views about the meaning of the key terms does not 
render the terms ambiguous. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 
(Utah Ct. App.) ("[A] contract term is not ambiguous simply because one party ascribes a 
different meaning to it to suit his or her own interests."), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 
(1993); see also Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Utah 1993) 
("However, policy terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks 
to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests.") A 
contract term is ambiguous if susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. 
Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52 [^19, 215 P.3d 933; see also ; see also S.W. 
Energy, 1999 UT 23 at f 14 ("An insurance policy may be ambiguous if it is unclear, 
omits terms, or is capable of two or more plausible meanings.") 
2. The Duty to Defend 
In Green v. State Farm, 2005 UT App 564, 127 P.3d 1279 , the Utah Court of 
Appeals summarized Utah's law on the duty to defend: 
Although it is a general rule that "an insurer's duty to defend is broader 
than the duty to indemnify," Sharon Steel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 
127, 133 (Utah 1997) , that duty is not without boundaries. "[T]he 
insured's obligation is not unlimited; the duty to defend is measured by the 
nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy and arises whenever the 
16 
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insurer ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the 
policy." Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. v. United States Fid. & Guar. 
Co., 714 P.2d. 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986), ... "Under Utah law, the scope of 
the risk an insurance company takes is determined by the terms of the 
policy, not the expectations of the insured." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 
904 F.Supp. 1270, 1277 n. 8 (D. Utah 1995). 
Id atlffllO, 12. 
Based on the foregoing tenets, the duty to defend analysis in Utah focuses on two 
documents: the insurance policy and the complaint. An insurer's duty to defend is 
determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the 
complaint. Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at \ 16 . "The test is whether the complaint alleges a 
risk within the coverage of the policy." Id. (quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate of 
Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, If 21, 27 P.3d 555). When the allegations of the underlying 
complaint, "if proved, could result in liability under the policy, then the insurer has a duty 
to defend." Sharon Steel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997). 
In Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United States Fid. & Guar. 
(Utah 1986) 714 P.2d. 1143, a case relied on by Basic Research, defendant Deseret was 
accused of constructively evicting the underlying plaintiff, Catherine's Beauty Salon 
(referred to in the decision as "Catherine's"), by virtue of demolition activities that 
Deseret was conducting on Deseret5s property where Catherine's was Deseret's tenant. 
One of the two insurers for Deseret, United Pacific, denied defense, a decision that was 
upheld by the trial court and affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The coverage issue 
was whether the alleged liability producing conduct was an "occurrence," i.e., an 
17 
i 
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"accident." The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision with respect to the "potential for 
coverage," set forth the nexi among the facts, the policy provisions and the insured's 
liability: 
The insurer must make a good faith determination based on all the 
facts known to it, or which by reasonable efforts could be discovered by it, 
that there is no potential liability under the policy. This means that there 
are no disputed facts which if proved by the plaintiff at trial would 
result in liability under the policy. However, this does not mean that the 
insurer can simply say, "We don't believe that the plaintiff can prove what 
he is alleging." The insurance contract includes the duty to defend even if 
the allegations in a suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. The question is 
whether the allegations, if proved, could result in liability under the policy. 
The policy describes the damages covered as "bodily injury or 
property damage caused by an occurrence" and then provides that "the 
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured 
seeking such damages on account of bodily injury or property damage..." 
Catherine's complaint did not allege, even in substance, bodily injury or 
property damage caused by an "occurrence." Catherine's alleged facts to 
support claims for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive 
eviction. Those allegations presented no potential liability under UP's 
insurance policy. Where there is no potential liability, there is no duty 
to defend. 
Id. at 1147 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the question with respect to the duty to defend is whether the alleged 
facts that create liability for damages on the part of the insured, if proved, would be 
covered under the policy. Until those facts are proved, there is only the potential that 
they will be proved. Accordingly, the Courts refer to the "potential for coverage" or the 
"potential for liability" under the policy. Conversely, when there is no potential for 
In accord, Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 133 (Utah 1997). 
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coverage (because the facts, if proven, do not come within the insuring agreement or are 
excluded from coverage), there is no duty to defend. 
B. The Nature and Structure of the "Personal and Advertising Injury" , 
Liability Coverage. 
1. The relationship between the "personal and advertising 
injury" offense and the insured's liability for damages. 
The designation of Coverage B as "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" is set forth 
in boldface capital letters and tells the insured, at the very least, that there is a connection 
between "Personal and Advertising Injury" and the insured's liability. See supra, STATEMENT 
OF FACTS at \ 8. 
The personal and advertising injury definition itself provides coverage for 
approximately fourteen types of categorized "offenses," and with each it is clear that the 
specific offense and conduct must have some causal link to the underlying plaintiffs 
claim of liability for damages. See supra id. at \ 9 ("'Personal and advertising injury' 
means injury, including consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or more of the 
following offenses . . . ."); see also National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. 
{ 
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) (the words "arising out o f 
"import a concept of causation" and require that "there be some causal relationship 
between the injury and risk for which coverage is provided."). The risk, for which \ 
coverage is provided, is any risk identified in the Insuring Agreement. 
For instance, subpart "a" of the "personal and advertising injury" definition 
< 
identifies the offenses of false arrest, detention or imprisonment. Clearly, the policy 
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provides and an insured would objectively and reasonably understand that where it is 
alleged that the insured will become liable for falsely arresting, detaining or imprisoning 
the complaining party, Admiral will defend and pay the damages the injured party may 
be awarded. Such construction can and should be applied to each subpart and offense of 
the "personal and advertising injury" definition, including subpart f, which is at issue 
here. Also, subpart "g," identifies the offense of infringement upon another's copyright, 
trade dress or slogan in the insured's advertisement. Clearly, the policy provides and a 
reasonable purchaser of insurance objectively understands that where it is alleged that the 
insured will become liable for infringing upon the underlying plaintiffs copyright, trade 
dress or slogan in its advertisement, Admiral will defend and pay the damages the injured 
plaintiff may be awarded. 
In sum, the complete list of the offenses, and the entire definition of "personal and 
advertising injury,"11 clearly advise the insured that the policy provides a defense to the 
In 1878, the United States Supreme Court employed the similar approach of applying 
the rule of noscitur a sociis in Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1879): 
...In the interpretation of written instruments and statutes that "a passage 
will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it." 
So, also, "the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the 
meaning of words associated with it." In Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 450, it 
is said: "It is a rule laid down by Lord Bacon, that copulatio verborum 
indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu, — the coupling of words together 
shows that they are to be understood in the same sense. And where the 
meaning of any particular word is doubtful or obscure, . . . the intention of 
the party who has made use of it may frequently be ascertained and carried 
unto effect by looking at the adjoining words." The same author says (p. 
455): "In the construction of statutes, likewise, the rule noscitur a sociis is 
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insured where it is alleged that the insured committed one of the defined offenses which 
is asserted to be the cause of the insured's liability for damages. 
2. The use of Western Holdings' Slogans is not an "offense." 
There is a reason for use of the term "offense." The conduct covered is conduct 
that is wrongful and offends someone. That someone is the underlying plaintiff who is 
seeking damages. Here, the Underlying Plaintiffs do not claim that they are offended 
much less injured by Basic Research's wrongful taking or use of another's advertising 
idea. Nor does the alleged trademark holder of the slogans, Western Holdings, claim that 
it is offended by Basic Research's use as it is undisputed that Basic Research had a 
license to use of the slogans. Indeed, the authorized use is inferred from the relationship 
between Basic Research and Western Holdings as evidenced by the fact that Western 
Holdings is a named insured under the 2008-2009 policy. [R 124*.] Accordingly, the use 
of the "slogans" cannot constitute an "offense" to trigger coverage under the Admiral 
policy. 
The court in the recent case Westfield Insurance Company v. Robinson Outdoors, 
very frequently applied; the meaning of a word, and, consequently the 
intention of the legislature, being ascertained by reference to the context, 
and by considering whether the word in question and the surrounding 
words are, in fact, ejusdem generis, and referable to the same subject-
matter." 
Id. at 708-709. In 1996 another court applied noscitur a sociis to find the lack of 
coverage under a policy's personal and advertising injury coverage. Applied Bolting 
Tech. Prods, v. U.S. Fid & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029, 1033, n. 6 (E.D. Pa, 1996). 
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Inc., 2011 WL 5593171 (D.Minn.) reached the same conclusion. Consumers sued 
Robinson Outdoors, Inc. (hereinafter "Robinson5') in multiple jurisdictions for false 
representations concerning the attributes of odor-eliminating clothing. Robinson sold its 
odor eliminating products under a license granted by ALS Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter 
"ALS"). Under the license, Robinson was contractually obligated to use the advertising, 
logos, brands and marks provided by ALS, and ALS created or approved all of 
Robinson's advertising. Id. at *1. 
Robinson sought defense and indemnification from its commercial general 
liability insurer, Westfield Insurance Co (hereinafter "Westfield"). Westfield denied any 
obligation to defend and indemnify Robinson, and then pursued a declaratory relief 
action. Id. at *2. 
In opposing Westfield's motion for summary judgment, Robinson contended that 
it was covered under the personal and advertising injury coverage for the offense of the 
"use of another's advertising idea..." The argument made by Robinson is the precise 
argument made by Basic Research here: that because the advertising idea was that of 
licensor ALS, the requisite "use of another's" was satisfied and coverage was triggered. 
The Court disagreed, finding that the offense means "wrongful taking of the manner by 
which another advertises its goods", and ruled: "Robinson's use of ALS's advertising 
ideas was not wrongful and did not constitute an offense because it was done under a 
license granted by ALS." Id. at *7. The Westfield Decision is appended as part of the 
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Addendum to this Brief. 
3. The Underlying Plaintiffs do not assert an "offense." 
The Underlying Plaintiffs do not question or claim the wrongful "use" or taking of 
Western Holding's slogans. Rather, they challenge the content and truth of the slogans. 
This precise issue was addressed in the Westfield case: 
Westfield presents no case law to support its assertion that this language 
would cover the licensed use of another's advertising idea. Moreover, the 
underlying complaints did not allege that Robinson took the advertising 
ideas of any of the plaintiffs in the underlying actions. See, e.g., 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1003 
(S.D.Ind. 2011) ("We are hard-pressed to understand how use of a co-
defendant's idea, as opposed to one of the plaintiff[']s, could be 
considered an 'offense.' ") 
Id. at n. 9 (emphasis within the original.) 
4. The requisite causal connection between the offense and the 
claimed damage is absent. 
As the definition of "personal and advertising injury" requires a causal connection 
between the enumerated offense and the underlying plaintiffs claim for liability, so too 
does Admiral's policy's insuring agreement's language require such causal connection. 
The insuring agreement provides: "We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to 
which this insurance applies..." [Emphasis added.] 
Under the clear language of the insuring agreement, the insured has coverage 
where the insured is 1) legally liable for damages, 2) because of "personal and 
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advertising injury;" and 3) to which the insurance applies (i.e., is not excluded). And 
the duty to defend requires the existence of alleged facts that, if proved, would be the 
basis for the insured's legal liability for damages. 
In sum, in order for there to be coverage, the advertising injury offense must cause 
the Underlying Plaintiffs damages and insured to be liable for those damages. And for 
there to be a duty to defend, the complaint must allege facts by which a personal and 
advertising injury offense is alleged and that offense, if proved, would render the insured 
liable for damages. Here no Underlying Plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured 
because Basic Research used or wrongfully took the advertising slogan of Western 
Holdings, rather than using its own slogan or idea. The offense complained of by the 
Underlying Plaintiffs is not that any particular person's representation was used; but that 
the representation, whoever the originator may have been, was false. 
C. Case Law Supports Admiral's Position 
Although Utah courts have not yet addressed the interpretation of the advertising 
injury offense in question, several other courts have done so. For example, in Clarcor, 
Inc. v. Columbia Casualty, 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D. Tenn. Dec 16, 2010) [R1443-
1454*], the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurer in an 
See generally, Fire Ins. Exchange v. Jimenez 184 Cal.App.3d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that the provision stating that there is no duty to defend for injury "to which this 
insurance does not apply," means that there is no duty to defend where an exclusion 
applies to what otherwise might be a covered suit). 
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action brought against insured Clarcor by the 3M Company and alleging false advertising 
under both federal and state law. 
Clarcor designed the packaging and advertising for its new line of Purolator filters 
which allegedly competed with 3M's Filtrete line. 3M claimed that Clarcor designed the 
packaging to convey the false and misleading claims that Purolator filters perform 
equally to, if not better than, 3M's Filtrete filters. 3M further maintained that several 
aspects of the package design created this false impression, including numerical 
performance claims of "overall filtration efficiency" and the claimed "respiratory 
protection factor." 3M charged, that consumers would be led to believe that the Purolator 
filter was more efficient in removing particles from the air than the 3M filter, even 
though Purolator's claim of 97% Overall Filtration Efficiency is not only literally false, it 
created a false impression of superiority to the 3M product. Id. at *2. 
Clarcor tendered defense to Columbia Casualty Company ("Columbia"), which 
declined coverage. Clarcor defended itself, settled with 3M, and then sued Columbia. In 
ruling upon the cross motions for summary judgment filed by Clarcor and Columbia, the 
court addressed claims similar to those made by Basic Research and construed policy 
language identical to that found in the Admiral policy. 
Clarcor contended that the allegations of the 3M complaint were covered under the 
offense of "use of another's advertising in your advertisement." Specifically, Clarcor 
contended that 3M's allegations of Clarcor's packaging and advertising ideas, such as 
25 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
color scheme and numerical rating system, were 3M's ideas, and that, when read in 
conjunction with 3M's other allegations, a covered claim was stated. However, the court 
noted that Clarcor re-characterized 3M's claims as involving an "advertising idea" by 
selectively choosing words and phrases from various sections of 3M's complaint and 
ultimately concluded, "3M's complaint involved false advertising. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs contentions on the issue are without merit." Id. at * 13. [ R 1452*.] 
Like Clarcor's attempted re-characterization of 3M's claim to trigger coverage, so 
too, has Basic Research cobbled together portions of the Underlying Complaints to claim 
that the Underlying Plaintiffs "do not allege injury from the class members' failure to 
lose weight, but from their purchase of the product caused by the advertising" [AOB at 
20]. In truth, each of the Underlying Plaintiffs specifically alleges that he or she used 
the product as directed and failed to lose weight. The Clarcor court reached the 
conclusion that 3M's claims against Clarcor were false advertising, and false advertising 
was not "use of another's advertising idea." Basic Research also stands accused of false 
advertising, not "use of another's advertising idea." 
In Welch Foods v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3928704 (D. Mass. 
2010), Welch manufactured and sold fruit juice, including what it described as "White 
Grape and Pomegranate" juice. The product label prominently pictured pomegranates 
when, in fact, the primary ingredients were white grape and apple juice. 
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Welch was sued by a competitor, POM Wonderful, a company that produced its 
own blended pomegranate juices, for false and misleading advertising. Thereafter a 
putative class of "disaffected consumers" sued Welch for false advertising and deceptive ( 
labeling. The POM complaint alleged that Welch had attempted to "cash in on POM's 
idea of selling bottled pomegranate juice by marketing and selling to consumers products 
i 
labeled as 'pomegranate juice' that in fact contain little or no actual pomegranate juice.5' 
Id. at * 4 n. 4. Similarly, the class action plaintiffs alleged that Welch used POM's 
advertising idea and misled consumers by "naming, labeling, packaging, marketing and 
advertising [Welch's juice] as [containing pomegranate juice]." Id. (brackets within 
original.)
 { 
Welch tendered both underlying actions to three of its insurers. Two declined 
coverage and one defended under a reservation of rights. All three were named as 
( 
defendants in coverage litigation. 
The matter was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. One of the 
issues was whether the allegations in the underlying cases implicated the policy's < 
coverage for the offense of "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement." 
The court found that no covered offense was alleged: 
I 
The essence of the argument is that Welch has "used" POM's advertising 
idea by claiming that pomegranate juice is an ingredient (with the 
attendant implication that Welch's product has salutary health effects). 
However, "the phrase 'advertising idea' relates to the manner in which 
one advertises its goods" and does not include the content of such 
advertising. (Citation.) The coverage provision is limited to Welch's use, 
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in its advertising ideas about how to solicit business and customers. 
(Citation.) Welch has not done that. 
Welch at *4 [R 1458*]. Once again, a court has refused to equate false advertising (be it 
claimed by a competitor or a consumer) with the covered offense of "use of another's 
advertising idea." 
In Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois International, 657 F.3d 1155 (11 Cir. 2011), the 
insured Trailer Bridge was accused of conspiracy to fix prices with respect to cabotage 
services. The complaint alleged that the defendants met secretly and issued materially 
false public statements about the reasons for rate and surcharge increases. The policy 
language was materially identical to that employed by Admiral herein. 
Before the trial court, Trailer Bridge pointed out that its CEO gave an interview to 
the Wall Street Transcript, a newsletter targeted at long-term investors, that constituted an 
"advertisement" and that the CEO deployed the "advertising idea" of "another" because 
the CEO's misleading justifications for price increases must have originated with Trailer 
Bridge's competitors (and alleged co-conspirators). Id. at 1138. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer ruling that the CEO's brief description 
of market conditions did not involve use of another's advertising ideas. Id. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted (and appended) the 
district court's "thorough and well-reasoned order." But before doing so, the court 
addressed the breadth of the coverage for "the use of another's advertising..." 
In particular, we agree with the district courts rejection of Trailer Bridge's 
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convoluted argument that the CEO's statement deployed the advertising 
idea of "another." The Policy defines "advertising injury5' as an injury 
arising from "[t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement.5 55 We reject Trailer Bridge's contention that the use of a 
co-defendant's (and alleged co-conspirator's) idea—as opposed to the idea { 
of a plaintiff in the underlying antitrust action—could qualify as an 
"offense55 under the Policy. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. 
Co., 772 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1003 ( S.D.Ind. 2011) (rejecting a similar 
argument and noting that research revealed no case in which "an 
underlying complaint for antitrust injury triggered an insurer's duty { 
to defend for an advertising injury caused by ... ' the use of another's 
advertising idea in your advertisement555). The underlying plaintiffs 
sought only antitrust damages; they did not seek to impose any legal 
obligation upon the insured to pay them damages "because of ... 
advertising injury.55 No facts were alleged in the underlying complaint on 
the basis of which the underlying plaintiffs might have recovered damages 
"because of... advertising injury55; and the underlying plaintiffs could not 
have recovered such damages because the allegedly misappropriated 
"advertising idea55 was not that of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather was
 { 
alleged to have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether. 
Trailer Bridge at 1139 (boldface in the original). 
While the Trailer Bridge case was decided under Florida law, a reading of the < 
decision shows that there is no material difference between the law of Florida and the law 
of Utah with respect to the interpretation of contracts or the breadth of the duty to defend. 
Before the district court, Trailer Bridge argued that it was of no moment that the 
underlying claims alleged violation of antitrust law. Rather all that was required to 
trigger coverage was: (i) that the Antitrust complaint allege that some injury arose out of j 
the use of another's advertising idea, (ii) that the Court must construe the policy liberally 
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, and (iii) that to limit coverage as 
suggested by the carrier would rewrite the contract. Id. at 1144-45. These are precisely 
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the same arguments advanced in this case The Court rejected Trailer Bridge's argument, 
noting, as Admiral claims herein, the relationship between the Insuring Agreement and 
the "personal and advertising injury" offense: 
The rule that an insurance policy should be interpreted liberally in favor of 
the insured applies only when there is more than one reasonable 
interpretation. (Citation omitted.) The Policy specifically states Illinois 
National must provide a defense only to cases seeking sums that the 
insured would become legally obligated to pay as damages "because o f 
personal and advertising injury. 
* * * * 
Thus, it is apparent the underlying plaintiffs allege their injuries were 
caused by higher prices arising from price-fixing, not from the use of 
another's advertising idea in Trailer Bridge's advertisement. None of the 
damages sought by the underlying plaintiffs in the Antitrust Complaint are 
payments requested "because o f an advertising injury, but instead were 
strictly for antitrust injuries. 
Id. at 1145. The Trailer Bridge decision is appended as part of the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
Lastly, the case of Rose Acre Farms v. Columbia Casualty, — F.3d — , 2011 WL 
5313818 (7th Cir. 2011), case is the most recent opinion to address and construe the 
enumerated offense of "use of another's advertising idea." The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected the same arguments made in Trailer Bridge case, and by Basic Research 
here, that a claim of use of another's advertising idea is enough to trigger coverage even 
though the underlying plaintiff is not seeking to hold the insured liable for such wrongful 
use or taking of the advertising idea. 
The insured, Rose Acre Farms, was sued in a number of class action suits for 
alleged price-fixing. The Rose Acre's insurers rejected the contention that there was a 
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duty to defend under the personal and advertising injury offense of "the use of another's 
advertising in your 'advertisement.'" Rose Acre sued its insurers for coverage and the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. Id. at * 1. j 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit was skeptical about whether there was any 
advertising involved in the underlying actions. But assuming that there was advertising 
involved in the underlying actions, the court found that the offense was not alleged: 
But this suit would fail even if one could tease out of the antitrust 
complaint a charge that Rose Acre's advertising was in furtherance of the
 { 
alleged antitrust conspiracy. Coverage of liability for an "offense" defined 
as "the use of another's advertising idea" in one's own advertising cannot 
extend to using another's advertising idea with that other's consent. 
Suppose Rose Acre published on its website the following ad, written by 
its director of marketing: "We are socialists, we abhor profits, and we sell i 
our eggs at cost." Although that ad might be thought in furtherance of the 
antitrust conspiracy, any antitrust liability that it created would not be 
"advertising injury" because the company's marketing director is not 
'another." What difference could it make if instead the ad had been 
written by Rose Acre's advertising agency? i 
Id. at *2. 
The Court then proceeded to trace the history of the "use of another's advertising 
idea" offense. It noted that this iteration of the offense replaced an earlier offense of 
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" and explained the 
reason for the revision: 
The reason [for the revision] was that a conflict had developed in the 
courts over whether "misappropriation" was used in the policy in its 
common law sense, which does not include trademark infringement, or 
should be read in a broader, layperson's sense. (Citations omitted.) To 
resolve the conflict, ISO replaced "misappropriation" with "use" and, for 
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good measure, added explicit coverage for trademark infringement. 
This history makes clear that coverage is limited to liability to the 
"other" whose advertising idea is used by the insured without the "other's" 
permission. That is what "misappropriation" is; and the question whether 
as used in an insurance policy it might embrace trademark infringement 
does not alter the understanding that using someone else's idea with that 
someone's consent is not misappropriation. 
7tf.at*2-3. 
That "use of another's advertising idea" is essentially "misappropriation" is the 
analysis that the district court made and followed in this case when it ruled that Basic 
research was not entitled to coverage. (Ruling Pages 13-15.) The Rose Acre decision is 
appended as part of the Addendum to this Brief. 
Applying the rationale and reasoning of the foregoing case law to the present case 
leads to the conclusion that the Underlying Plaintiffs allege that Basic Research falsely 
advertised Akavar by claiming that consumers of the product could "EAT ALL YOU 
WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT" and that "WE COULDN'T SAY IT IN PRINT IF 
IT WASNT TRUE." Those claims of injury concern the alleged false content of the 
slogans, and do not in any way arise out of the wrongful taking or use of Western 
Holding's advertising idea as required to trigger coverage. Basic Research's attempt to 
force the Underlying Plaintiffs' false advertisement claims into the covered offense of 
"the use of another's advertising idea" is tortured and does not trigger coverage. 
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Admiral. 
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D. The Applicability of Exclusion "g." 
Exclusion "g" provides that there is no coverage for personal or advertising injury 
"arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of 
quality or performance made in [the insured's] 'advertisement'." See STATEMENT OF 
FACTS at flO [R 38, 97]. The plain foundation of the Underlying Plaintiffs' claims: 
that each relied on false advertising that told him or her in no uncertain terms ("we 
couldn't say it if it wasn't true") that Akavar worked such that a purchaser could "eat all 
you want and still lose weight." These statements go to the heart of the product's quality 
and performance and the alleged failure to conform to the advertised statement. 
The Underlying Plaintiffs make the clear and unambiguous charge that Basic 
Research represented that its product would cause weight loss irrespective of the user's 
eating habits. Such a representation is clearly a statement as to the quality or 
performance of the product and falls within the scope of Exclusion "g" such that there is 
no duty to defend against the claim that the statement is untrue. 
Total Call Int% Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 181 Cal App.4th 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010), collects and summarizes the cases that address Exclusion "g", also known as the 
"Failure to Conform" Exclusion.13 The Total Call Court states: 
Total Call itself did not involve the offense of "use of another's advertising idea." It 
involved alleged trade libel and disparagement. However, the court did find Exclusion 
"g" applicable. 
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L. No Coverage Due to Exclusion 
We also conclude that there was no potential for policy coverage in view of 
the nonconformity exclusion, which bars coverage for advertising injury 
rising out of the 'failure of goods, products or services to conform, with 
statement of quality or performance made in [the insured's! 
advertisement."" Several courts have held m.a this exclusion precludes 
coverage for third pan suns prediealed on allegations that the insured's 
advertising misrepresented the quaht\ o; price o1 the insured^ o^n pn <' *.t 
m Miyiuik ita. .<,,* LN.L.\, 1 nc. v. Assurance < e I i i nw \i 4w«- F.3d b82, 
984, a seller ol control devices for garage dooi openeis advertised that its 
devices were compatible with the security features of a manufacturer's 
i oner, but the devices, in feet, disabled the secunn features Whit: he 
manufacturer sued tin seller \\>i iah- advcnisane.. the *elk-'s ?n- rer 
declined to provide a defense, pointing to the exclusion at issue belon us. 
" ',/.) After the insurer obtained a summary judgment in its favor in the 
ter's bad faith action, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the 
iiilacturer's claims relied entirely on the allegation that the seller's 
.ees "[did] not live up to the promise of compatibility," and thus 
co\erage lor the claims was precluded under the nonconformity exclusion. 
(Id at pp. 984-985,} 
In New Hampshire Ins. t o. v. Power-u real, inc {> i tr ivvw) 907 F.2d 
58, 58-59, a competitor of the insured sued the insured for deceptive 
business practices, alleging that the insured's ,ui\crtising mislabeled the 
insured's own composted manure products. The Highth Circuit concluded 
that ti^ allegations in ihe third part) complaint did not trigger the insurer's 
duty t«' defend, reasoning that thev wete barred h\ an exclusion essentially 
simila u- ih.at before us i *W at p ^0 ) 
Finally iii ^upcrpcr/ormuncc 7//n/,. . ;iurt/orj uoy. ms. \L..L.. \ . ' uz; 
203 F.Supp.2d 587. 58(>-5c)(L a manufacturer of sports cars anci . tted 
produ t s.^4; tlu insured !*•! marketing similar products mproperb 
bearing the manufacturer'- name After the insurer declined ! - pro'-i \: 
defense \v t!u: action. :he koera! district s r oneluded that the 
nonconn u ty exclusion precluded coverage ult r u manufacaref- sdse 
adver!isr) Jaims. (hi :\\ v <(>^ * 
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TCI contends that the nonconformity exclusion is ambiguous, and can be 
reasonably understood as operating to bar coverage for claims by 
consumers, but not claims by competitors. Pointing to Aragon-Haas v. 
Family Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal App.3d 232 [282 Ca. 
Rptr. 233. {Aragon-Haas), TCI argues that we are obliged to accept its 
proffered interpretation of the exclusion for purposes of assessing Peerless's 
demurrer, (fn. omitted). As the nonconformity exclusion is not ambiguous, 
we reject TCFs contention. 
Total Calllnt'l, 181 Cal.App.4th at 172-173. 
The foregoing cases and the courts' analyses of Exclusion "g" are persuasive. The 
scope of the policy does not include coverage for false advertising with respect to the 
quality or performance of the insured's goods, products or services. The Underlying 
Plaintiffs charge that Akavar doesn't work like the advertisement says it will. That is, 
you can't eat all you want and still lose weight. The allegations clearly incriminate the 
product's quality and performance. Accordingly, the exclusion is applicable and 
precludes coverage for Basic Research. 
RESPONSE TO BASIC RESEARCH ARGUMENTS 
The arguments advanced by Basic Research are addressed above by Admiral's 
arguments and authorities in support of its argument. However, some of Basic 
Research's particular arguments warrant specific comment. 
A. No Reasonable Interpretation of the Underlying Actions Leads to the 
Conclusion that Any of the Underlying Plaintiffs Assert the Offense of 
"Use of Another's Advertising Idea" or That the Policy Language is 
Ambiguous. 
Any reasonable interpretation of the Underlying Actions leads to the determination 
that the Underlying Plaintiffs allege that Basic Research falsely advertised Akavar in 
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their ads by claiming * .* * 1 • ~ * ! 
wouldn't do with ihe appropnau effori ilk- Underl}ing Plaintiffs* claims focu^ u^ ihc 
content of the ads theniseives arid not the use of another's advertising idea, Basic 
Rcsciich ^ iiltoitipi n JHH inniiii iliusi I IJIIII inhi 111 IIMIHI offense i I illllii n1 I 
another's advertising idea" is tortured and unreasonable. Moreover, while at :uin she 
basic tenets *.rr TT!ah insurance h\\\ MMI insurant'- ^ -r- _ language is considered 
ambigut u . cr ^ two or more plausible meanings, and ambiguities are 
construeu a ^^ •<.< = - v •• 
interpretation. 
Citing five supposed icanons |/\OR 32-33] that the policy's term "of another" 
those incriminated b} UnderKiny Plaintiffs Research fails to MIUW VMI 
interpretation is reasonable (i.e., would be the understanding of the i-rdinar insured.) 
Set •/* - . * )t»-i M ^ ° 
meaning be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence <\--w J ' ^ ^ M >It«lii ••" " 
Basic Research's asserted reasons for tin; term ol another" explains why, the reasonable 
iiisiihti vnHilil I I 111 in Ik Mini, uii Iht/ OIK' IK *•• ; c K no coverage if he came up with the 
false or misleading statement hini sell, hil MI Ihr olhrr t.iitd lli.'ir r, ro\ /rain1 i! sonn um 
else conjured up the misrepresentation which the insured then used. 
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The Court in Westfield posed that same inquiry and rejected this interpretation of 
the policy language. See Westfield , 2011 WL 5593171 at *7. See also Rose Acre 
Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F.Supp.2d 994, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2011) ("We are 
hard-pressed to understand how use of a co-defendant's idea, as opposed to one of the 
plaintiffs, could be considered an 'offense.'"). 
While courts resort to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain or ordinary 
meaning of words used in an insurance contract, they do not cherry pick definitions and 
use them literally without reference to context and the agreement in its entirety. 
In Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992), the California 
Supreme Court rejected the premise that because terms in a policy could be interpreted in 
a particular fashion, they should be. The insured was charged with a variety of 
transgressions amounting to unfair competition under California statutes. The Bank 
sought coverage under a policy that covered "unfair competition" as part of its 
advertising injury coverage. The Court of Appeal held that the term "unfair competition" 
was ambiguous because it could refer to either common law or statutory law. The 
California Supreme Court reversed, holding that only common law unfair competition 
was covered. 
The court conceded the insured's arguments that it was "plausible" that the term 
"unfair competition" included statutory unfair competition, "that policy terms must be 
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interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense'" and that a dictionary definition could be 
used to support the insured's position. It noted, however: 
While the foregoing argument is probably correct as a matter of abstract 
philology; it is defective as \ matter of policy interpretation because it 
disregards the context I'he policy does not purport to cover "unfair 
competition" in the abstract; instead, it covers "damages" for "advertising 
injury" caused by "unfair competition." Read in this context, the term 
"unfair competition" can only refer to a civil wrong that can support an 
award of damages. 
Bank of the West at 552. 
Essentially, Basic Research contend^ hat because the phrase term "of another" 
could be literally interpreted to rut; \« :.. ..lvciusii.:. K;_„ jf anyone otliei than the 
insi ii e d it mi ist be Iiitei preted tli i • i * • , \ c 1 1 1 1 1 f • 11 f IN > 11 < • , » 1 1 1 i II 1 1 1 1 
Underlying Actuals. *»r M ihe vorj le;r_-t, be Ibmid nnhmuot^ \clmiral rejects that 
contention and ,; ^nmlii im ^nrt Ao nond
 ( i |h l l i - the policy is looked at as an 
integrated don : * ' •* • *• ising Iiiji uy " Is ie1 \ e d in 
the context of the injuring agreement, it is deal thai the policy covers the insured's 
liability for damages "because o f the "personal and advertising injury" offense, which in 
this c •: ise is tl u ; i » fl ense of "i lse of ai lothei ' s acl^  ei tising idea." 
Mureovci, rather than finding real differences in the case lavv relied upon b> 
Admiral, Basic Research either cites factual distinctions that make no difference or 
Such suggestions are simply not true. A considered read mi H \\K I asc- shows that all of 
the state laws that have been applied to these issues interpret insurance policies exactly as 
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does Utah. All of the cases cited by Admiral involve policy provisions that are identical 
to or are materially indistinguishable from Admiral's policy provision. All of the 
decisions relied upon are well reasoned and consistent with each other and with 
Admiral's position. 
B. There Are No Facts Alleged or Presented That Indicate That 
Plaintiffs Are Claiming or Could Claim That They Have Been Injured 
Because Basic Research Used A Trademark of Western Holdings 
Rather Than One of Its Own. 
There is nothing in Basic Research's argument referencing any fact, or set of facts, 
or otherwise suggesting that any of the Underlying Plaintiffs' claims are premised on the 
contention that Basic Research employed someone else's advertising idea and that this 
act caused them damage. To the contrary, Basic Research will be liable, if at all, to the 
Underlying Plaintiffs without reference to who conceived or owned a trademark on the 
taglines/slogans. The liability producing allegations are that the advertising was false, 
that Underlying Plaintiffs relied on the false advertising and they were damaged because 
the product didn't work as advertised. Under those operative facts, Basic Research will 
face liability whether or not the incriminated representations were its own conception or 
the conception of someone else. Those operative alleged facts do not fall within the 
scope of coverage of Admiral's policy. 
C. The Class Certification Order 
Perhaps foreseeing the problem with its policy interpretation, Basic Research 
asserts that the district court's conclusion, that Underlying Plaintiffs' damages resulted 
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not from Basic Research's advertising but from Akavar's failure to perform as advertised, 
is refuted by the Wilier/Tompkins court's Class Certification Order [See A OB II \2 ] 
This assenion U^K- : .. :it, 
I he class Certification Order was presented to the trial court w ith a request for 
judicial notice four d;n s after oral argument of the cnv. ni- t: *\w Un- xummarv hid-: J* 
and fifty seven days beloic HK *-i Jer was render 
i o the district ^ouii. aee 
U. R. Civ. P. 7(d) [R 15744592.] Accordingly, it she mid not be considered part of the 
evidentiary record for the purposes of the cross-motion for ^immarv , idgiiK a [n any 
event -:\ n*x- /< < - ^ - - • • -1- ^ .
 ( *
 :
 M 
The Certification Order defines the class in the Miller/Tompkins case as: "Persons 
who purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the marketing slogan "Eat all you want and 
still ••'••M^  weight1 (liunifj the .*.w,u;.. w.tinages period ll'tom Hns deseriplum I'I.ISIH 
Research argues: 
The under]vinu complaints allege the class member- were injured or harmed 
by Basic Research's USL of advertising phrases because consumers have 
been misled into buying Akavar |R 8.28, c>19, *P] |i»14-M.| They do not 
allege injury from the class members" failure i<< !*-(. •*.»• vhi ut from the 
purchase o f th r pnulut't ctiKed b\ the ridvertisine 
[AOB 20.] Basic Research concludesi 
This order is fully consistent with the allegations of the Milicr and lu?h;>h. •* 
complaints, in which the class members alleged injuries (parting w 
money) arising out ol their purchase of Akavar after seeing or hearing lias -
]<v<;e'irrh\ -nK tMii^-ments -, •»r\uniu<j the accused "advertising idea" -
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without regard to whether Akavar worked as advertised or whether 
they actually lost weight or even tried the product after buying it. 
[AOB 20] [emphasis in the original.] This argument, Admiral submits, personifies the 
basic misconceptions Basic Research is promoting with respect to advertising injury 
liability insurance and the sum and substance of the Underlying Actions. 
This Certification Order simply limits those persons who can qualify to be 
plaintiffs. It provides parameters with regard to Basic Research's conduct the 
Underlying Plaintiffs must allege or prove in order to establish their claim of liability. 
Indeed, as the Court's discussion with respect to the breadth of the class certification 
shows, the issue of reliance was omitted due to the need for individual findings on that 
issue. In fact, Basic Research argued that the requirement of individual proof of reliance 
was a basis for decertifying the class. [R 473.] 
In sum, the Certification Order in no way circumscribes the Underlying Plaintiffs' 
claims as Basic Research submits. While people who purchased the product but never 
used it would be members of the class, they would not have a viable claim. Indeed, 
Basic Research points to no allegation that any class representative falls into such a 
category.14 
Moreover, employing Basic Research's logic, the class would include people who 
purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the marketing slogan "Eat all you want and still 
lose weight" during the relevant damages period, used it as directed and lost more weight 
than they could have possibly imagined. For obvious reasons none of the class 
representatives makes such a claim. 
41 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Even if by some stretch of the imagination, pi ; u >• M ,-, c\ iised the product 
could recover, their remedies would not be "damages*" as ih.it icrm is used in the Admiral 
policy. The remedy wonu \K. K anutu . nu; \ uicha^ put* i «K t a]-- a-ilecnvcly, 
damages. They are equitable remedies. 
In Bank of the Wes? " ?///>cr;r- rv.v,* /^/< . ^ ° P V a4 ^ 'V ~ ' 
aildicssnJ lln uranul , , •. :v, • n*-_c- urpi^i r: 
virtually all forms of monetary relief I 'he Court rejected the argument, noting that 
'[i]t is well established "that one may n.»i Insure against ?1u risk of being ordered to 
return mom or nropert^ ...... :.„.. aeon wront: !,JI> , iu r in ., .;•, ; a.icrs do not award 
'damages' ;r ih,»i vi • . . : • > . . • " . • '*. - f i 833 I ' 2< I 
at 553 (and cases cited therein). 
I he Court further noted that "[i]f insurance coverage were available for monetary 
would simph -in'• ;nc u ^ u, his mauler ~nd, in LIL^U, ;CIUI*A «*w proceeds ui m^ 
unlau hn ,'oinjiH i *MU h n result would be inconsistent with the act's deterrent purpose. 
Bank of 'the W rest at 553. . • 
As to claims for injunctive relief, the California Supreme Cour t held in AID Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court ^ Cal 3d 807 838 (Calif 1990), that the cc >sts of injunctive 
rt.'lid wtidhn nil mi' d UH piuphvlailu , mitigative, or remedial purposes, do not readil) 
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satisfy the statutory or dictionary definitions of "damages." Because such costs are paid 
to employees or independent contractors rather than aggrieved parties, they do not 
directly "compensate" aggrieved persons for "loss" or "detriment." When one looks at 
the provisions of the policy Insuring Agreement, inclusive of the definitions, the only 
reasonable interpretation is that the policy covers the insured's liability to a party that 
claims to have sustained harm because of the insured's use of that party's advertising idea 
in the insured's advertisement. That interpretation is consistent with the basic promise of 
any liability policy which is to protect the insured from judgments that encompass 
damages caused by offenses that are within the promises made in the contract. That 
interpretation is supported by the decisions in Westfield, Trailer Bridge and Rose Acre. 
D. Exclusion "g" Precludes Coverage 
If the allegations fall within a policy exclusion, there is no duty to defend. See 
Deseret Fed. Co. supra., 714 P.2d at 1147 ("Conversely, where there is no potential 
liability [due to the fact that the allegations fall within the scope of an exclusion], there is 
no duty to defend any underlying lawsuit."). Basic Research again parses words from 
dictionary definitions to attempt to avoid the clear conclusion that the exclusion for 
'"personal and advertising injury' arising out of the failure of goods, products or services 
to conform with any statement of quality or performance made in your 'advertisement'" 
is applicable. [AOB 45-46.] 
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The essence of the Underlying l*laintills' claims is that the) read the 
advertisement, bought the product, took it as directed and didn't lose weight. It is hard 
to imagine how si ich clain is fail to i eflect on the quality or performance of. W; ar 
E. The DISH Network € < m r 
Basic Research points out that the district court decision in DISH Network Corp. v, 
10 Circuit. DISH Network ^urp. v. Arch Specialty m&. i c , bj^ f.j>d !;.' ; 
2011) (interpreting Colorado hmV From this reversal Basic research asserts that "b) 
repealed C;:HIL ..IKS i.c^vii; 1^-. UIL. wi. iu. *ti>inct coin* t decision .• f / Network, 
J u d p ! *' ^ ei - ir-r-: • -;'o .» - . In: iterpi etation 
advertising idea' to mean ""wrongful taking of another's advertising idea."* [AOB 23-24.] 
in auualii). ihcrL1 i>. Homme in the Tenth Circuit Court decision that in any fashion 
impi igns Judge De \ rer's anal)' sis 
DISH /\" et H i v k raised if i s issi i * : f \ v 1 letl i "i a liability policy - co v e ring 
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" could cover a patent 
infringement case. In reviewing an extensive amount of case law, the court noted that the 
with products the insured happened to advertise, rather than a means of advertising =: 
the insured used to market its own products 
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The court found, by contrast, that Dish allegedly committed patent infringement 
by using RAKTL's technology to sell Dish's own non-infringing satellite television 
products and services. It sided with the several courts considering similar facts, that have 
affirmatively held that where an advertising technique itself is patented, its infringement 
may constitute advertising injury. The ultimate conclusion was that there were sufficient 
allegations and extrinsic evidence to create the possibility that there was a 
misappropriation of advertising ideas: 
Because we conclude that the complaint potentially alleges advertising 
injury arising from the misappropriation of advertising ideas, we reverse 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1014. In supporting its conclusion, the Court noted: 
More specifically, however, the complaint may be read to allege actions 
that misappropriated patented advertising ideas, insofar as the product at 
issue was designed expressly for product promotion and dissemination of 
advertising information. 
Id. at 1022 
Of interest is the fact that one of the defendants, Arch Specialty, had the newer 
policy language employed in the Admiral policy. Other than mentioning that the Arch 
Specialty policy covered the "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement", 
the court did not address that language. One suspects that this circumstance is because 
the Arch Specialty policy had a patent infringement exclusion, an issue that was going to 
be addressed on remand. 
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In sum, 'the Tenth Circuit did precisely what Judge Dever did. \ U * ^ > the 
underlying complaints to see if anything had been alleged that woul IK covered if 
Admiral Personal and Advertising Liability Coverage is applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Wiiiiiiil u'siKVlliill1, ivi|iir.ls illiiill tin iili'flinl MIIIII1 i.'iiinl (il suimnim in lll.t" m 
of Admiral should be affirmed. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2012. 
Ci IRIS i ENSEN & JENSEN, P C. 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Rebecca I,. Hill 
David J. Garthe [Pro Hac V ice] 
Boornazian Jensen & Garthe 
555 12th Street, Suite 1800 
Oakland, California 9460 7 
Attorneys for Admiral Insurance Co. 
46 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of January, 2012,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE ADMIRAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Aaron C. Garrett 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David A. Gauntlett 
GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300 
Irvine, CA 92612 
47 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I O M P L I A N C E WITH RULES 24 AND 27 
Certificate of Coi npliance w Itli I ;; > pe \ • :)li 11 ee l imitations and I ;> peface 
Requirements. 
1. This Brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah i< pp :\ .!4( ;m) 
because this Brief contains 11,703 words and doe-: n< •! -isc monospaced face type. 
2. I his Brief complies with the typeface requirements oi man K. ,\pp. r. ^/(b) 
because this Brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 
Microsoft Word 2010 in 13 point, Times New Roman. 
iMsMa^MiM 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Rebecca I..}Till 
David J. Garthc [Pro Hoc l'u c\ 
Boornazian Jensen &• < iartlu, 
55^ i 2th Street, Suite \$m) 
OaMand, California 94607 
Dated this 5ih Da> ul January, 2012 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
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3. Clarcor, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co, 2010 WL 11607 (M.D. Tenn.) 
4. Welch Foods, INc i \,IUOII,II I mon I lie hisiihiiia ( . . ,
 t / ul MHII \M *«>.'X/(M 
(D. Mass. 2010) 
5. Westfield Insurance Company v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 2011 WL 5593171 (D. 
Minn ™ m 
b. Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Insurance Company, 657 F.3d 1135 ( l l ' 1 
Cir. : u l h 
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Case , 'DM i.,v 008' Mb' W l 'MI nun nl '.'| i i l t ' i l O V O * 
"Property damage" ta "impaired property" or 
property that has not been pbysicaDy injured arts 
ingoutof: 
(1) A delect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous 
condition in "your product* or "your work"; 
€ 1 
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on 
your behalf to perform a contract or agree-
ment in accordance with its leans. 
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of 
other property arising out of sudden and accidental 
physical injury to "your product" or "your work" 
after it has been put to its intended use. 
in. Ret a 1 Of P r od u c f s, W nrk O r I m pa ired 
Properly 
Damages claimed for 'any loss, cost or expense in-
curred by you or others for the loss of use, with-
drawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement ad-
justment,, removal or disposal of 
(1). n four product"; 
(2) "Your work-; or 
(3) "Impaired property"; 
if such product,. ,"workr or property is withdrawn or 
recalled from the market or from use by any per-
son or organizarios because of a known or sus-
pected" defect,, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous 
condition in i t 
©. Personal And Advertising Injury 
"Bodily injury" arising out of "personal and adver 
rising injury", 
p. Electronic Data 
Damages arising out of the loss of* loss of use 0f, 
damajge to, corruption o£ mabiliry to access, or in-
ability1 to manipulate electronic data. 
As used in this exclusion, electronic data means in-
formatioo, fescts or progranis stored as or on, cre-
ated Or used on, or transmitted &iw--&pm:GQQ& 
put^r software, includingsystems and applications 
software, hard or Soppy disks* CD-ROMS, tapes, 
drives, cells, data processing devices orany other 
media which are used with electronically con-
trolled equipment 
tfc. ]>iStittbiSdii Of'Mate rial In 'I tciiaf'Mii Of 
Statute* 
*Bodi^ y mjury" of "pmperfy damage* arising di-
recrly or mdirectfy out of any action or omission 
that violates or is alleged to violate; 
(1) I he I elcphone Cons urn er ft-otection Act 
(TCPA), including any amendment of or addi-
tion to such law; or 
(2) The CAN-SPAM Art of.2003, .including any 
amendment of or addition to such law; or 
(3) Any statute, ordmance or regukricn, other 
than the TCPA or CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 
that prohibits or limits the sending, ttassmit-
ting, conmumicaring or distribution of mate-
rial of information. 
Exclusions, c* through n, 'do not apply to damage by. fire 
to premises while rented to you or temporarily occu* 
pied by you with permission of the owner, A separate 
limit of tnsurance applies to this coverage as described 
in Section III ~ Limits Qf Insurance. 
COVERAGE B-FERSONA.L AND ADVERTISING 
MJURYIJABIIJTY 
1. Insuring Agreement 
JU We- will pay those sums- thai the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
"personai and advertising injury" to which mis 
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty 
to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking 
those damages. However, we will have no doty 10 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking 
damages for "persona I and advertising injury* to 
which this insurance does not apply. We may, at 
our discretion, investigate any offense and settle 
any claim or "suit* that may result. But* 
(1) The amount we will pay for damages is lim-
ited as described in Section HI - limits Of 
Insurance; and 
(2) Our right and duty to defend end w ucu w r 
have used up the applicable Emit of msunm .* 
in me payment of judgments or settlements 
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses 
under Coverage C. 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or per-
form acts or services is Covered unless expficitly 
provided for under -Supplementary Payments -
Coverage^ A and B. 
b. This insurance applies to "personal and advertising 
injury caused by an difense -arising: out ofyour 
busmess, but only if; 
(1) Ilie'offisBSe'was-.cxmimitteci in, the "coverage 
territory"; 
(2) The offense was not committed!, before the- * 
Retroactive Date, if any, shown in the Decla-
mtipns or after the eod of the -policy period; 
and 
1 1, itfiftt I'5II? * m.i- j l ies inc l«>6 Page 5-of 1? 
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Our obligation to defexid an insured's indemnitee and to' 
pay for attorneys' fees and necessary litigation ex-
penses as Supplementary Payments ends when we have 
used up the applicable limit of insurance in the pay-
ment of judgments or settlements or the conditions set 
forth above, or the terms of the agreement described in 
Paragraph f« above, are no longer met. 
SECTION D - WHO IS AN INSURED 
1* If you are designated in the Declarations as: 
a. An individual, you and your spouse are insureds, 
but only with resjpeci to the conduct of a business 
of which you are the sole owner. 
b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured. 
Your members, your partners, and their spouses 
are also insureds, but only with respect to the con-
duct of your business. 
c. A limited liability company, you are an insured 
Your members are also insureds, bat only with re-
spect to me conduct of your business. Your man-
agers are insureds, but only with respect to their 
duties as your managers. 
<L An organization other than a partnership^  joint 
venture or limited liability company, you are an in-
sured. Your "executive officers" and directors are 
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as 
your officers or directors. Your stockholders are 
also insureds, but only with respect to their habtl-
ity as stockholders. 
e, A trust, you are an insured. Your trustees ate also 
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as 
trustees. 
2. Each of the following is also an insured: 
a. Your "volunteer worJoers" only while perforjoaing 
duties relaled to the conduct of your business, or 
your "employees", other than either your ^ execu-
tive officers'* (if you are an organization other than 
a partnership, joint venture or limited liability 
company) or your managers (tf you are a limited 
liability coinpany), but only for acts within the 
scope of theiremptoyrQeat by ypU or while per-
forming duties related to the conduct of your busi-
ness. However, none of these "eixmk>yees* of 
"volunteer workers" are msureds for; 
(1J "Bodily ittpary*- or "persona! and advertising 
injury1*: 
*>, 
(a) To you, to your partners or members (if 
you are a partnership or joim venture), to 
your members (If you are a limited liabil-
ity company), to a cc^eanployee" while 
* in the course of his or her employment or 
perfoiming duties related to the conduct 
of your business, or to your other "volun-
teer workers" while perfonning duties re-
lated to the conduct of your business; 
(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother or 
sister of that co-'employee" or "volunteer 
worker" as a consequence of Paragraph 
(a) above; 
(e) For which there is any obligation to share 
damages with or repay someone else who 
must pay damages because of the injury 
described in Paragraphs (a) or (b) above; 
or 
(d) Arising out of his or her providing or fell-
ing to provide professional health care 
services. 
(2) "Property damage" to property: 
(a) Owned, occupied or used by, 
(b) Rented to, in the care, custody or control 
o£ or over which physical control is be-
ing exercised for any purpose by 
you, any of your '"employees", "volunteer 
workers", any partner or member (if you are a 
partnership or joint venture), or any member 
(if you are a limited liability company). 
Any person (other than your "employee* or "vol-
unteer worker0) or any organization while acting 
as your real estate managerv 
Any person or organization having proper tempo-
rary custody of your property if you die, but only: 
(1) With respect to Kabihiy arlsmg out of me 
maintenance, or use of that property; and 
(2) Until your legal representative has been ap^  
pointed. 
Your legal repacesentatrvedf you dk, but only with 
respect to duties as sock that represrajtative will 
have all your rights and duties under mis Coverage 
Part 
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Policy Number. CAOG0Q11665-02 AD 07 85 01 95 
Issued Date: 10/17/2008 Effective Date: 08/20/2008 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
NAMED INNlIKHI> ENDORSEMENT 
This endorsement modifies- insurance provided under-the folio wing: 
:t )MMERICAL_GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART' 
. j K agreed tbe Named Insured as shown on the Common-Policy DecI.arati.OB5 is as follows: 
COVARIXLLC 
DBA; BASIC RESEARCH LLC; 
OOVARIX, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
WESTERN HOLDINGS, I LC AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
COMMAND ENTERPRISE, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
PC MANAGEMENT AND S! JBSIDI ARIES; 
5742 HOUSINGS LLC 
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12. Plaintiff, Donna Patterson, is a resident of Washington, DC. In or around 
August 2007, Ms. Patterson observed an advertisement for Akavar published in a national 
women's magazine that she read while at a hair salon in Washington, DC. The 
advertisement, wrhich contained the image of a female model, touted Akavar as a new 
"EUROPEAN W E I G H T LOSS B R EA KTHR OU GH" that had fast acting caloric 
restriction. (A copy of an Akavar advertisement containing the image of a female model 
similar to that viewed by Ms. Patterson is attached hereto as Exhibit B). The advertisement 
also stated that one could "EAT ALL Y O U W A N T & STILL LOSE WEIGHT. 
Based upon this advertising by Defendants, Ms. Patterson purchased a supply of Akavar 
from a General Nutrition Center store located in Arlington, Virginia, for approximately 
$40.00. After 30 days of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Patterson 
had lost no weight, and she ceased taking the product. 
Defendant Basic Research 
13. Defendant Basic Research is a limited liability company established under the 
laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 5742 West Harold 
Gatty Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
14. Basic Research claims that is one of the largest nutraceutical companies in the 
United States with annual sales revenues in excess of $50 million. Basic Research develops, 
manufactures and markets scores of cosmetics, nutritional supplements and dietary 
supplements that are marketed under the names of nearly a dozen limited liability companies 
that have been formed by Defendants. Upon information and belief, Basic Research 
conducts business under, or is directly affiliated with, each of these limited liability 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
M.D. Tennessee, 
Nashville Division. 
CLARCOR, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
COLUMBIA CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant. 
No. 3:10-00336. 
Dec. 16,2010. 
Robert Earl Boston, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Da-
vis, LLP, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff. 
Rebecca Brinkley, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, 
LLP, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff/Defendant. 
April T. Villaverde, Margaret F. Catalano, Carroll, 
McNulty & Kull, LLC, Basking Ridge, NJ, Randall 
Chadwell Ferguson, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, 
Nashville, TN, for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR., District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff, Clarcor, Inc., a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Tennessee, filed 
this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the federal diver-
sity statute, against the Defendant, Columbia Casualty 
Company, an insurance company organized and ex-
isting under the laws of Illinois with its principal place 
of business in Illinois. Plaintiff asserts claims of 
breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Con-
sumer Protection Act, ("TCPA"), Tenn.Code Ann. $$ 
47-18-101 et seq., and violation of the Tennessee Bad 
Faith Act Statute, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 56-7-105 et seq. 
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment on whether under 
Defendant's insurance policy, the Defendant owed a 
duty to defend and indemnify Plaintiff under the pol-
icy for claims in a prior action against Plaintiff. 
Before the Court are Plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 14) and De-
fendant's cross motion for summary judgment (Docket 
Entry No. 28). In its motion, Plaintiff contends that 
some of the claims and allegations in 3M's complaint 
fall within the "personal and advertising injury" cov-
Page 1 
erage in Defendant's policy. Plaintiff also contends 
that Defendant has a duty to indemnify it for the 
damages that Plaintiff will have to pay in connection 
with its settlement with 3M. In its motion, Defendant 
argues that 3M's complaint only contains claims for 
false advertising under state and federal law and 
Plaintiff erroneously recharacterizes 3M's claims and 
allegations in an effort to qualify under the policy's 
"personal and advertising injury" coverage. Further, 
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs claims are also 
barred by the "failure to conform" exclusion in the 
policy and 3M's complaint does not satisfy the terms 
of the "personal and advertising injury" coverage. 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court con-
cludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
should be granted because the allegations and claims 
in the underlying action did not state claims covered 
under the Defendant's policy. The claims in the prior 
action were excluded under the failure to conform 
exclusion in the Defendant's policy. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT3 1 1 
FN1. Upon a motion for summary judgment, 
the factual contentions are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment. Duchon v. 
Caion Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir.1986). 
As will be discussed infra, upon the filing of 
a motion for summary judgment, the oppos-
ing party must come forth with sufficient 
evidence to withstand a motion for directed 
verdict, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Ml U.S. 
242, 247-52,106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 
£1986}, particularly where there has been an 
opportunity for discovery. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Because there are not 
any material factual disputes, this section 
constitutes findings of fact under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). 
Plaintiff obtained a commercial general liability 
insurance policy from the Defendant, number 
0223304983, with effective dates from December 1, 
2008 to December 1, 2009 (the "Policy"). (Docket 
Entry No. 37, Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs 
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Statement of Undisputed Facts, at ^ 1). This Policy 
states, in relevant part, under COVERAGE B 
PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LI-
ABILITY, that: 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this in-
surance applies. We will have the right and duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking those 
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend 
the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this in-
surance does not apply. [... ] 
*2 b. This insurance applies to "personal and ad-
vertising injury" caused by an offense arising out of 
your business but only if the offense was committed 
in the "coverage territory" during the policy period. 
SECTION V-DEFINITIONS 
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast 
or published to the general public or specific market 
segments about your goods, products or services for 
the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. 
For the purposes of this definition: 
a. Notices that are published include material placed 
on the Internet or on similar electronic means of 
communication; and 
b. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site 
that is about your goods, products or services for the 
purposes of attracting customers or supporters is 
considered as advertisement. 
* * * 
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, 
including consequential "bodily injury", arising out 
of one or more of the following offenses: 
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment; 
b. Malicious prosecution; 
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, 
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a 
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, 
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or 
Page 2 
lessor; 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that ... or disparages a person's or or-
ganization's goods, products or services; 
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that violates a person's right of privacy; 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
"advertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade 
dress or slogan in your "advertisement". 
Id. at \ 3 (emphasis added by Plaintiff). . 
In addition, the policy contains the following 
relevant exclusion claim: 
(g) Quality Or Performance Of Goods-Failure 
To Conform To Statements 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
the failure of goods, products or services to con-
form with any statement of quality or perfor-
mance made in your "advertisement". 
(Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 2 at 8). 
On August 14, 2009, 3M Company ("3M") filed 
an action against a Clarcor subsidiary in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia. 3M Company v. Clarcor Air Filtration Prods., 
Inc., 1:09-cv-00909. (Docket Entry No. 37 at f 4). 3M 
summarized its claim in its complaint: 
Through this Complaint, brought under the false 
advertising provisions of the federal Lanham Act 
and the Virginia False Advertising Statute, 3M 
seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction re-
quiring Purolator to stop its false claims, to cease 
and desist from its predatory, false advertising 
campaign, and to pay damages to 3M based on these 
violations. 
(Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at 2). 3M's 
complaint specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
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H 17. Clarcor designed the packaging and advertis-
ing for its new line of Purolator filters to resemble 
that of 3M's Filtrete line in several key aspects, in an 
evident scheme to parasitize the excellent reputation 
of 3M's Filtrete products. Specific examples of the 
ways in which Clarcor is attempting to accomplish 
this, by using various false and misleading adver-
tising claims, are set forth in detail below. 
* * * 
CLARCOR'S FALSE AND MISLEADING AD-
VERTISING CLAIMS 
False Comparative Performance Claims 
*3 U 25. In furtherance of its predatory scheme to 
take retail shelf space and market share away from 
3M, Clarcor designed the packaging for Purolator 
products to convey the false and misleading claims 
that Purolator filters perform equally to, if not better 
than, 3M's Filtrete filters. Several aspects of the 
Purolator package design create this false impres-
sion, including the numerical performance claims of 
"overall filtration efficiency," the claimed "respir-
atory protection factor," and similarities in color. 
H 26. For example, one of 3M's line of Filtrete filters 
is called the "Ultra Allergen" and is sold in a purple 
package that labels the filter as "90% effective at 
attracting and capturing large airborne allergens 
like: pollen, mold spores and dust mite debris." ... 
% 27. Clarcor has recently launched its own 
purple "Allergen" filter, which it claims on the 
package provides u97% Overall Filtration Effi-
ciency" (emphasis added) [emphasis in com-
plaint] ... 
11 28. Consumers seeing these competing package 
claims will undoubtedly be led to believe that the 
Purolator purple filter is even more efficient at re-
moving particles from the air than the 3M Ultra 
Allergen filter. The Purolator filter is claimed to 
remove 97% of all particles ("97% Overall Filtra-
tion Efficiency"). By contrast, the 3M filter is la-
beled to remove only 90% of large particles ("90% 
effective at attracting and capturing large airborne 
allergens...."). As set forth below, Purolator's 
claim of 97% Overall Filtration Efficiency is not 
only literally false, it creates a false impression of 
superiority to 3M's Ultra Allergen filter. Both 
false claims are conclusively disproven by testing 
at leading independent labs. 
Page 3 
11 29. Clarcor's misleading claims of similarity be-
tween the 3M and Purolator filters do not stop there. 
As shown in Figure 1 above, 3M labels its filters 
with a Microparticle Performance Rating ("MPR"), 
a metric designed by 3M to inform consumers how 
well each filter in its Filtrete product line performs 
relative to other Filtrete filters in the line. For ex-
ample, 3M's purple Filtrete "Ultra Allergen" filter is 
labeled with an MPR of 1250. 3M's red Filtrete 
"Micro Allergen" filter is labeled with an MPR of 
1000. Other filters in the Filtrete line are labeled 
with MPRs ranging from 300 to 2200. 
1) 30. It is no coincidence that Clarcor labels its 
Purolator purple Allergen filter with what is plainly 
intended to be a comparable numerical performance 
value. Although Clarcor calls its metric the "Res-
piratory Protection Factor" ("RPF"), it chose to as-
sign the very same number-1250-to its purple Al-
lergen filter that 3M used in connection with its 
purple Filtrete filter, thus, directly copying 3M's key 
MPR performance metric for the analogous product. 
Purolator's adoption of the exact same number used 
by 3M on its own purple package leads both retail-
ers and consumers to believe the Purolator product 
filters the air as well as the 3M product. 
*4 K 31. Finally, Clarcor intentionally adopted the 
color purple for its Purolator Allergen filter. 3M's 
Ultra Allergen filter package exemplifies 3M's use 
of specific colors to convey the various efficiency 
levels of 3M's filters. Clarcor's choice of purple, 
along with the false claim of 97% Overall Filtration 
Efficiency and the RPF of 1250 collectively imply 
to consumers that the purple Purolator filter is equal 
to or better than the purple 3M filter, and that con-
sumers switching to Purolator will experience no 
decline in performance if they buy the Purolator 
filter instead of the 3M filter. 
K 32. Purolator's monadic and comparative 
performance claims are false. Testing of both 
brands of filters by two leading, independent testing 
laboratories, proves that Purolator's purple Allergen 
filters are significantly inferior to Filtrete's purple 
Ultra Allergen filters in their ability to filter all 
measured sizes of particles from the air. In particu-
lar, the Purolator filters perform far worse in their 
ability to filter the smallest particles, such as smoke 
and bacteria, which are important contributors to 
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poor indoor air quality. Thus, Purolator's implied 
comparative performance claims to 3M Filtrete 
are false. Testing also demonstrates that 
Purolator's claims ofu Overall Filtration Effi-
ciency" are literally false, standing alone. 
^ 33. Clarcor's false implied claims are not lim-
ited to the purple Purolator filter, but also apply 
to other Purolator products. Specifically, 3M's 
red Filtrete filter, called the "Micro Allergen," is 
labeled to have an MPR of 1000. Purolator offers a 
red filter as well, labeled with an RPF of 1050, and 
as having an Overall Filtration Efficiency of 95%. 
In this manner the packaging and advertising for the 
red Purolator filter also mimics aspects of the 
packaging and claims for the red Filtrete filters to 
create the false impression of superior performance 
to Filtrete. As with the purple filters, testing of both 
brands of red filters by two leading, independent 
testing laboratories proves that Purolator's red filters 
are not superior to Filtrete's red Micro Allergen 
filters in their ability to filter all measured sizes of 
particles from the air. 
^ 34. Purolator's use of Filtrete's color scheme, RPF 
ratings similar to Filtrete's MPR ratings, and over-
stated Overall Filtration Efficiency claims are fac-
tors likely to be material to consumers on the market 
for home HVAC filters. Upon information and be-
lief, consumers select their home HVAC filters 
based on the color, RPF or MPR rating, and Overall 
Filtration Efficiency claims, upon other factors. 
* * * 
H 63. The false and misleading advertising claims 
described in paragraphs 1-62 above will, if al-
lowed to continue, profoundly hurt 3M,s sales of 
home HVAC filters and irreparably harm its 
market share and reputation in the category. 
Filtrete filters have already been removed from 
shelves at some Lowe's stores. If Clarcor's scheme 
is successful, 3M filters may be removed from many 
more Lowe's stores in the near future. Once 3M 
loses its presence on store shelves in this manner, it 
will be highly difficult, if not impossible for 3M to 
regain. 
* * * 
*51 65. As a direct and proximate result of all of 
Clarcor's false claims on its Purolator packaging and 
advertising, as detailed in paragraphs 1 through 62 
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above, 3M has suffered harm, including lost sales and 
loss of market share, due to retail stores removing 
Filtrete products from their shelves to make room for 
Purolator filters, has lost goodwill in the marketplace, 
and has suffered damage in reputation in the market-
place. Unless this Court enjoins Clarcor from contin-
uing its false advertising, 3M will continue to suffer 
further irreparable harm in the future. 3M, therefore, 
seeks an immediate stop to Clarcor's false claims, 
through withdrawal of the offending packaging from 
the market. 
Id. at 5, 7-11, 19-20, Attachment 3 (emphasis 
added). For relief, 3M sought, among other things, 
D. Orders enjoining Clarcor from copying elements 
of the packaging and design of Filtrete filters 
packaging in a manner that reasonably suggests or 
implies that the two products are equivalent in 
performance, or that the Purolator filter is superior 
to the 3M filter, when they are not.... 
Orders enjoining Clarcor from disseminating or 
causing the dissemination of the following false 
claims in any packaging, advertising, radio or tele-
vision commercials, or other promotional activities 
or materials for its Purolator filters ... [.] 
Id. at 23. 
Plaintiff timely requested insurance coverage for 
3M's action that the Defendant acknowledged on 
August 21, 2009. (Docket Entry No. 37 at ] 6). On 
October 9, 2009, 3M filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction, asserting the 'literally false" standard for 
Plaintiffs alleged false advertising. Id. at \\ 7-8. The 
district court denied 3M's motion for preliminary 
injunction on its "literally false" theory and concluded 
that 3M had not shown a likelihood to succeed on "its 
literal falsity claim." Id. at fl 9-10; Docket Entry No. 
14, attachment No. 5 at p. 68. The district court stated: 
The Court cannot conclude that there's a likelihood 
of success in proving a lack of any reliable data to 
support the MERV ratings with respect to either the 
blue or the red. It would require more information 
than the Court has before it, including the nature of 
the tests, conditions under which those tests were 
conducted, and basically to make a scientific find-
ing as to the results of each test. 
When that's compared with the data that was-the 
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testing that Clarcor itself conducted is corroborated, 
at least to a certain extent, by the 3M testing, the 
Court must conclude that 3M has not made a clear 
showing of likelihood of succe [ss] on ... its literal 
falsity claim. 
(Docket Entry No. 14 at Attachment No. 5 at p. 
68). 
On October 16,2009, Defendant notified Plaintiff 
of its intention to disclaim any obligation to defend or 
indemnify Clarcor in connection with the 3M action. 
(Docket Entry No. 14 at Attachment 7). Defendant 
cited, among others, Plaintiffs policy's provisions on 
its failure to conform exclusion. Id. at 12. Plaintiff 
responded with letters dated October 30, 2009, and 
December 23, 2009, disputing Defendant's position. 
Id., Attachments 8 and 10. By letters dated November 
10, 2009, and January 28, 2009, the Defendant reaf-
firmed its denial of coverage. Id., Attachments 9 and 
11. 
*6 Plaintiff defended the 3M action at its cost and 
settled the 3M action by entering into a confidential 
settlement agreement with 3M. (Docket Entry No. 37 
at T| 12). The settlement agreement did not require 
Clarcor to pay damages to a third party. Id. at f 13; 
(Docket Entry No. 16, Settlement Agreement). 
Clarcor, however, must, among other things, package 
and repackage certain of its products and devise a new 
numbering or rating system for its filters' effective-
ness. Id. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
"The very mission of the summary judgment 
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the 
proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need 
for trial." Advisor y Committee Notes on Rule 56, 
Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules (West 
Ed. 1989). Moreover, "district courts are widely 
acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary 
judgment sua sponte, so long as the opposing party 
was on notice that [he] had to come forward with all of 
[his] evidence/' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); 
accord, Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 
873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1989). 
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 411 U.S. 242, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United 
States Supreme Court explained the nature of a morion 
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for summary judgment: 
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." By its very terms, this standard provides that 
the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 
properly supported motion for summary judgment; 
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 
material fact. 
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify 
which facts are material. Only disputes over facts 
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
governing law will properly preclude the entry of 
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrel-
evant or unnecessary will not be counted. 
477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original and 
added in part). Earlier the Supreme Court defined a 
material fact for Rule 56 purposes as "[w]here the 
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier 
of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 
'genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita Electrical In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587, 
106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations 
omitted). 
A motion for summary judgment is to be consid-
ered after adequate time for discovery. Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 326 (1986). Where there has been a reasonable 
opportunity for discovery, the party opposing the 
motion must make an affirmative showing of the need 
for additional discovery after the filing of a motion for 
summary judgment. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 
351, 355-57 (6th Cir.1989). But see Routman v. Au-
tomatic Data Processing. Inc.. 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th 
Cir.1989). 
*7 There is a certain framework in considering a 
summary judgment motion as to the required showing 
of the respective parties, as described by the Court in 
Celotex: 
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment al-
ways bears the initial responsibility of informing the 
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district court of the basis for its motion, and iden-
tifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any," which it be-
lieves demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.... [W]e find no express or implied 
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party sup-
port its motion with affidavits or other similar ma-
terials negating the opponent's claim.. 
Celotex. 477 U.S. at 323 (emphasis deleted). 
As the Court of Appeals explained, "[t]he moving 
party bears the burden of satisfying Rule 56(c) stand-
ards." Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239, n. 4 (6th 
Cir.1986). The moving party's burden is to show 
"clearly and convincingly" the absence of any genuine 
issues of material fact. Sims v. Memphis Processors, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Ko-
chins v. Linden-Alimak Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th 
Cir.1986)). "So long as the movant has met its initial 
burden of 'demonstrating] the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact,7 the nonmoving party then 
'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial/ " Emmons, 874 F.2d at 353 
(quoting Celotex and Rule 56(e)). 
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit warned that "the respondent must adduce more 
than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion 
[and]... must 'present affirmative evidence in order to 
defeat a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment.' " Street v. J.C Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 
1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Liberty Lobby ). 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals explained that: 
The respondent must "do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken 
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 
find" for the respondent, the motion should be 
granted. The trial court has at least some discretion 
to determine whether the respondent's claim is 
"implausible." 
Street. 886 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted). See 
also Hutt v. Gibson Fiber Glass Products, 914 F.2d 
790,792 (6th Cir.1990) ("A court deciding a motion 
for summary judgment must determine 'whether the 
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 
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submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that 
one party must prevail as a matter of law/ ") (quoting 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52). 
If both parties make their respective showings, 
the Court then determines if the material factual dis-
pute is genuine, applying the governing law. 
More important for present purposes, summary 
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material 
fact is "genuine, " that is, if the evidence is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party. 
*8 . . . . 
Progressing to the specific issue in this case, we are 
convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment or for a directed 
verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evi-
dentiary standard of proof that would apply at the 
trial on the merits. If the defendant in a 
run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary 
judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack 
of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask him-
self not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably 
favors one side or the other but whether a 
fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the 
plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere ex-
istence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the 
plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find 
for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, un-
avoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict- "whether there is 
[evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed 
to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon 
whom the onus of proof is imposed. " 
Liberty* Lobby. All U.S. at 248, 252 (citation 
omitted and emphasis added). 
It is likewise true that: 
In ruling on [a] motion for summary judgment, the 
court must construe the evidence in its most favor-
able light in favor of the party opposing the motion 
and against the movant. Further, the papers sup-
porting the movant are closely scrutinized, whereas 
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the opponent's are indulgently treated. 
It has been stated that: 'The purpose of the hearing 
on the motion for such a judgment is not to resolve 
factual issues. It is to determine whether there is any 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute....' 
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King 
Corp.. 303 F.2d 425, 427 (6th Cir.1962) (citations 
omitted). As the Sixth Circuit stated, "[a]ll facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom must be read in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion" Duchon v. Caion Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th 
Or. 1986). 
The Sixth Circuit further explained the District 
Court's role in evaluating the proof on a summary 
judgment motion: 
A district court is not required to speculate on which 
portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor 
is it obligated to wade through and search the entire 
record for some specific facts that might support the 
nonmoving party's claim. Rule 56 contemplates a 
limited marshalling of evidence by the nonmoving 
party sufficient to establish a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact for trial. This marshalling of evidence, 
however, does not require the nonmoving party to 
"designate" facts by citing specific page numbers. 
Designate means simply ctto point out the location 
of." Webster's Third New InterNational Dictionary 
(1986). 
Of course, the designated portions of the record 
must be presented with enough specificity that the 
district court can readily identify the facts upon 
which the nonmoving party relies; but that need for 
specificity must be balanced against a party's need 
to be fairly apprised of how much specificity the 
district court requires. This notice can be adequately 
accomplished through a local court rule or a pretrial 
order. 
*9 InterRoval Corp. v. Sponseller. 889 F.2d 108, 
111 (6th Cir.1989). Here, the parties have given some 
references to the proof upon which they rely. Local 
Rules 56.01 (b)-(d) require a showing of undisputed 
and disputed facts. 
In Street, the Court of Appeals discussed the 
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trilogy of leading Supreme Court decisions, and other 
authorities on summary judgment and synthesized ten 
rules in the "new era" on summary judgment motions: 
1. Complex cases are not necessarily inappropriate 
for summary judgment. 
2. Cases involving state of mind issues are not 
necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. 
3. The movant must meet the initial burden of 
showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's 
case. 
4. This burden may be met by pointing out to the 
court that the respondent, having had sufficient 
opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to sup-
port an essential element of his or her case. 
5. A court should apply a federal directed verdict 
standard in ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment. The inquiry on a summary judgment motion 
or a directed verdict motion is the same: "whether 
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 
require submission to a jury or whether it is so 
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of 
law" 
6. As on federal directed verdict motions, the 
"scintilla rule" applies, i.e., the respondent must 
adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to over-
come the motion. 
7. The substantive law governing the case will de-
termine what issues of fact are material, and any 
heightened burden of proof required by the sub-
stantive law for an element of the respondent's case, 
such as proof by clear and convincing evidence, 
must be satisfied by the respondent. 
8. The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the 
trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a 
disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evi-
dence in order to defeat a properly supported motion 
for summary judgment." 
9. The trial court no longer has the duty to search the 
entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
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10. The trial court has more discretion than in the 
"old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. 
The respondent must "do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken 
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 
find" for the respondent, the motion should be 
granted. The trial court has at least some discretion 
to determine whether the respondent's claim is 
"implausible." 
pleading test for determination of the duty to defend is 
based exclusively on the facts as alleged rather than on 
the facts as they actually are...." St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 835 
(Tenn.1994) (citation omitted). The "plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that its damages are covered by the 
terms of the policy; the defendant, in turn, must es-
tablish the applicability of any exclusions on which it 
relies." Charles Hampton's A-1 Signs, Inc. v. Am. 
States Ins. Co.. 225 S.W.3d 482, 487 
(Tenn.Ct.App.2006). 
Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-80 (citations and foot-
notes omitted). 
The Court has distilled from these collective 
holdings four issues that are to be addressed upon a 
motion for summary judgment: (1) has the moving 
party "clearly and convincingly" established the ab-
sence of material facts?; (2) if so, does the plaintiff 
present sufficient facts to establish all the elements of 
the asserted claim or defense?; (3) if factual support is 
presented by the nonmoving party, are those facts 
sufficiently plausible to support a jury verdict or 
judgment under the applicable law?; and (4) are there 
any genuine factual issues with respect to those ma-
terial facts under the governing law? 
Under Tennessee law, the Court's inquiry is con-
fined to the allegations in the complaint in the cited 
a c t ion. Drexel Chem. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 933 
S.W.2d471 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996V 
If even one of the allegations is covered by the 
policy, the insurer has a duty to defend, irrespective 
of the number of allegations that may be excluded 
by the policy. An insurer may not properly refuse to 
defend an action against its insured unless "it is 
plain from the face of the complaint that the allega-
tions fail to state facts that bring the case within or 
potentially within the policy's coverage." 
Id. at 480 (citations omitted). 
*10 In this diversity action, the Court applies the 
substantive law of the forum state, including the fo-
rum's choice of law rules. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). 
Without a choice-of-law provision in the policy, the 
Court concludes that Tennessee law applies to this 
action where the insurance policy was issued and 
delivered in Tennessee. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Chester-O'Donley & Assocs., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 1, 5 
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1998). Tennessee courts construe any 
ambiguities in an insurance policy in favor of the 
insured. Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 
195, 200 (Tenn.2000). Yet, if the terms of the policy 
are clear, the Court enforces insurance contracts "ac-
cording to their plain terms" with the language con-
strued in its "plain, ordinary and popular sense." Id. In 
a word, Tennessee courts do not create a new insur-
ance contract for the parties. Id. 
"An insurer's duty to defend is separate and dis-
tinct from the insurer's obligation to pay claims under 
the policy. The duty to defend is broader than the duty 
to indemnify." Id. (citation omitted). "In any event, the 
In analyzing these coverage claims, Tennessee 
law also considers the gravamen of the factual allega-
tions and claims. 
"It would be inappropriate for us to conduct a 
word-by-word analysis of the complaint, patching 
one word from one paragraph to another word from 
another paragraph, because such a review might 
very well cause us to find meaning where none 
otherwise existed. The proper extent of our review 
simply requires us to focus attention on the facts 
alleged as they appear in the complaint to determine 
if they could even potentially be covered by the 
[insurer]." 
Insura Property and Cos. Ins. Co. v. Ashe, No. 
M2002-00374-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 253255, at *4 
(6th Cir. Feb. 6.2003) (citation omitted). 
*11 Under the policy at issue, the Defendant "will 
have the right and duty to defend [PlaintiffJ against 
any 'suit' see king [personal and advertising injury 
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liability] damages." Thus, Defendant's duty was trig-
gered (1) if the 3M litigation were a "suit" seeking 
"damages" (2) the action was for "personal and ad-
vertising injury liability", and (3) coverage was not 
barred by the policy's exclusion provision. Defendant 
does not contest that the 3M action constituted a "suit" 
under the policy. Defendant contends that 3M's claims 
were only for false advertising that is not covered 
under the policy. Plaintiff contends that the 3M com-
plaint alleged a "personal and advertising injury" 
claim of disparagement, "use of another's advertising 
idea in your 4advertisement,' " and either trade dress 
or slogan infringement. Plaintiff does not dispute that 
false advertising claims are not covered under the 
policy. 
As a general observation and consistent with 
principles in Insura, the Court concludes that 3M's 
claims were for false advertising. 3M's complaint 
asserted claims for false advertising under the federal 
Lanham Act and the Virginia False Advertising stat-
ute. 3M sought preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief requiring Plaintiff to cease and desist from 
Plaintiffs alleged predatory, false advertising cam-
paign, and to pay damages to 3M based on those vio-
lations. (Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at 2). The 
elements of a Lanham Act claim for false advertising 
are that: (1) the defendant made false or misleading 
statements of fact concerning his product or another's; 
(2) the statement actually or tends to deceive a sub-
stantial portion of the intended audience; (3) the 
statement is material in that it will likely influence the 
deceived consumer's purchasing decisions; (4) the 
advertisements were introduced into interstate com-
merce; and (5) there is some causal link between the 
challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff. 
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports and Exports, 
Inc.. 270 F.3d 298. 323(6th Cir.2001). 
The 3M complaint contains numerous headings 
and sub-headings referring to Clarcor's false adver-
tising. The principal heading described "CLARCOR'S 
FALSE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING 
CLAIMS" and the sub-headings were: "False Com-
parative Performance Claims;" "False 'Overal Filtra-
tion Efficiency' Claims;" "False Claims of Certifica-
tion or Compliance With Government Standard;" and 
"False MERV Ratings." (Docket Entry No. 14, At-
tachment 3 at 7, 11, 14, 18, fl 25-62). 
Applying Insura, the Court concludes that 3M's 
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complaint presented claims for false advertising and 
such claims are not covered by the Defendant's policy. 
A. Disparagement 
Plaintiff cites paragraphs 17, 25, 28-31, 33, 63 
and 65 in 3M's complaint as setting forth claims as 
disparagement claims. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts defines disparagement as follows: 
One who publishes a. false statement harmful to the 
interest of another is subject to liability for pecuni-
ary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for 
publication of the statement to result in harm to in-
terests of the other having a pecuniary value, or ei-
ther recognizes or should recognize that it is likely 
to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false 
or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. 
*12 Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Levine, No. 
3:05-0240, 2005 WL 1799305, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. July 
27, 2005) (quoting Section 623A, "Liability for Pub-
lication of Injurious Falsehood-General Principle") 
(emphasis added). 
Yet, the cited portions of 3M's complaint allege 
that Clarcor made false statements about Clarcor's 
product. Such factual allegations do not state a cog-
nizable claim for disparagement. See Duramax Ma-
rine LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of III, No. 03-3500, 
2004 WL 1759146, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug.3, 2004) 
(holding that the underlying complaint did not contain 
a claim for disparagement since it only alleged that the 
insured made "false statements about [the insured's] 
own products-not that [the insured] made false state-
ments about [the underlying plaintiffs] products."); 
see also Gibson Guitar. 2005 WL 1799305, at *2 
(finding no disparaging statement where defendant 
was only promoting its product). 
B. Use of Another's Advertising Idea 
Plaintiff next cites paragraphs 17, 25, 29-31, and 
33-34 of 3M's complaint as arguably stating a claim 
for the ctuse of another's advertising idea in your 'ad-
vertisement.7 " Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 
3M's allegations of Clarcor's packaging and advertis-
ing ideas, such as the color scheme and numerical 
rating system, were 3M's ideas. When read in con-
junction with 3M's remaining allegations in the cited 
paragraphs, Plaintiff contends that a claim covered by 
Defendant's policy, is stated. Defendant argues that 
Plaintiff recharacterizes 3M's claims as involving an 
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"advertising idea" by selectively choosing words and 
phrases from various sections of 3M's complaint. 
Defendant contends that the mere fact that 3M's 
complaint alleges facts establishing Clarcor's false 
comparative advertising-in the context of a false ad-
vertising count-is insufficient to constitute a claim for 
wrongful use of another's advertising idea. 
An "Advertising idea" has been defined as "an 
idea for advertising that is 'novel and new/ and 
'definite and concrete/ such that it is capable of being 
identified as having been created by one party and 
stolen or appropriated by another." Sorbee Intern. Ltd 
v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co.. 735 A.2d 712, 714 
(Pa.Super.Ct.1999). 
3M's complaint reveals that the factual allegations 
in paragraphs 17, 25, 29-31, and 33-34 state a claim 
for false advertising and do not fall under the policy's 
coverage for the use of an "advertising idea." 3M did 
not allege a trademark in its color scheme and its 
rating system nor that its color scheme coupled with 
its rating system, were wrongfully taken. Purple is not 
shown to be a novel color, and Clarcor used its own 
rating system-"RPF"-not 3M's "MPR." The gravamen 
of 3M's complaint was that Clarcor's color scheme and 
rating system reinforces Clarcor's false statements on 
its packaging that its Purolator purple filter can re-
move 97% of all particles while the 3M filter can 
remove only 90% of large particles, Clarcor's 
Purolator red filter has an overall filtration efficiency 
of 95% and testing of both brands by independent 
laboratories conclusively proved that Clarcor's 
Purolator's filters are not superior to 3M's. (Docket 
Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at ffl| 28, 32-33). In these 
circumstances, the Court concludes that 3M's action 
did not involve an "advertising idea." 
*13 Plaintiff next cites its settlement agreement 
with 3M as evidence "that the preponderance of the 
dispute between 3M and Clarcor was related to the 
Clarcor's alleged 'copying1 of various 3M ideas in 
Clarcor's advertisements, all of which constituted 
'personal and advertising injury' " under the policy. 
Under Tennessee law, "[t]he pleading test for deter-
mination of the duty to defend is based exclusively on 
the facts as alleged rather than on the facts as they 
actually are." Torpoco. 879 S.W.2d at 835. Based 
upon the Court's review, 3M's complaint involved 
false advertising. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contentions 
on these issues are without merit. 
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C. Trade Dress or Slogan Infringement 
Plaintiff next cites paragraphs 17, 25, 29-31, and 
33-34 in 3M's complaint as claims and allegations that 
could arguably state a claim for trade dress or slogan 
infringement. Defendant responds that 3M's complaint 
does not allege claims for "trade dress" or "slogan" 
infringement, nor are the terms "trade dress," "slogan" 
and "infringement" mentioned. 
"To sustain a claim for trade dress infringement, a 
plaintiff must prove that the allegedly misappropriated 
features of the dress (1) are inherently distinctive or 
have acquired distinction by virtue of secondary 
meaning in the marketplace; (2) are not functional; 
and (3) create a likelihood of confusion as to the 
source of defendant's goods." Windmill Corp. v. Kelly 
Foods Corp., Nos. 94-5874. 94-5890, 95-5137, 1996 
WL 33251. at *3 (6th Cir. Jan.26, 1996). 
3M's complaint does not allege any of these ele-
ments of a trade dress claim nor that 3M had a slogan 
that Clarcor mfringed. In Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. 
Fed. Ins. Co.. 252 F.3d 608, 618-19 (2d Cir.2001X 
referring to Nike's "Just Do It" and American Ex-
press's "Don't Leave Home Without Us" as slogans to 
promote house marks, the Second Circuit stated, 
"[T]he relevant federal cases indicate that 'trade-
marked slogans' are phrases used to promote or ad-
vertise a house mark or product mark, in contradis-
tinction to the house or product mark itself." (empha-
sis in original). The cited paragraphs of 3M's com-
plaint involve only Clarcor's "false and misleading 
claims that Purolator filters perform equally to, if not 
better than, 3M's Filtrete filters." Accordin gly, the 
Court concludes that Plaintiffs contention as to trade 
dress or slogan infringement is without merit. 
D. Failure to Conform Exclusion 
Defendant's failure to conform exclusion provi-
sion precludes coverage for " 'Personal and advertis-
ing injury' arising out of the failure of goods, products 
or services to conform with any statement of quality or 
performance made in your 'advertisement.' " In De-
fendant's view, 3M's complaint is excluded under the 
policy's failure to conform exclusion because Plain-
tiffs product allegedly did not conform to its adver-
tisement. Plaintiff contends that the exclusion does not 
preclude Defendant's duty to defend because some of 
the allegations in 3M's complaint fall outside the 
scope of the exclusion and the failure to conform 
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exclusion only applies to an actual failure to conform, 
not alleged failures. Plaintiff cites 3M's allegations 
about Clarcor's use of its color scheme and numerical 
rating system that are not "statements] of quality or 
performance" and that Clarcor's advertisements left 
consumers with the impression that Clarcor's Purola-
tor filters were as good or better than 3M's. In any 
event, Plaintiff contends that such "performance 
statements" do not trigger the exclusion because ex-
clusion g requires actual failure of Clarcor's filters to 
conform to its statements, not alleged failure. 
*14 The term "statement" is defined as "an 
opinion, comment, or message conveyed indirectly 
usually by nonverbal means <monuments are state-
merits in form and space>." See 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stateme 
nt (emphasis in original). Assuming that Plaintiff 
established that 3M's complaint alleged a "personal 
and advertising injury" offense, as stated previously, 
"the pleading test for determination of the duty to 
defend is based exclusively on the facts as alleged 
rather than on the facts as they actually are." Tor-
poco. 879 S.W.2d at 835. 
In Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. 
Transportation Ins. Co... 500 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.2007), 
a series of class actions against Del Monte asserted 
claims of fraud and violations of the antitrust laws 
arising out of Del Monte's marketing of its pineapples. 
Id. at 642. Each complaint alleged that Del Monte 
knowingly submitted fraudulent patent applications, 
knowingly sent false letters to competitors regarding 
its patent rights, and knowingly engaged in fraudulent 
patent litigation. Id. at 643. The Seventh Circuit stat-
ed: 
Del Monte does not point to a single factual allega-
tion that is not a part of a specific allegation of fraud 
and that does not use the language of the "paradigm 
of intentional conduct." The class plaintiffs can 
prevail only if they are able to prove that the un-
derlying statements made by Del Monte were 
knowingly false. Therefore, the complaints at issue 
in this case fall squarely within the exclusion in the 
policy for personal or advertising injury if the injury 
arose out of statements made by the insured (or at its 
direction) with knowledge of falsity. 
Id. at 645. There, the Court held: 
The allegations against Del Monte in the underlying 
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complaints are specific. They depend on a showing 
of knowledge of falsity as part of an underlying 
fraudulent scheme in order to obtain relief. Del 
Monte believes that Transportation still has the duty 
to defend them because, as it claimed at oral argu-
ment, the statements Del Monte made were true. 
But this misses the point. Whether there is a duty to 
defend depends on the complaint, not on the in-
sured's belief that the complaint is mistaken. If Del 
Monte's statements prove to be true, it will not be 
liable in the class actions. It cannot be the case that 
the policy exclusion applies only when the insured 
concedes that it has engaged in false or fraudulent 
acts. The allegations rule, and under these allega-
tions, Transportation had no duty to furnish a de-
fense for Del Monte. 
Id. at 646-47. 
Similarly, as to the paragraphs of 3M's complaint 
(paragraphs 17, 25, 28-31, 33-34, 63 and 65) cited by 
Plaintiff as stating a claim, neither d, f, nor g of De-
fendant's policy covers 3M's false and misleading 
claims against Clarcor. Accordingly, the Court con-
cludes that exclusion g in the Defendant's policy ap-
plies to bar coverage. Therefore, Plaintiffs contention 
is without merit. 
E. Duty to Indemnify 
*15 Finally, Defendant's policy provides, "We 
will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and 
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies." 
Because Plaintiff failed to prove damages as a result of 
"personal and advertising injury," the Court concludes 
that Plaintiffs indemnity claim also fails. 
For these reasons, the Court concludes that De-
fendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket En-
try No. 28) should be granted and Plaintiffs motion 
for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 14) 
should be denied. 
An appropriate Order is filed herewith. 
ENTERED this the day of December, 2010. 
ORDER 
In accordance with the Memorandum filed here-
with, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
l*Wi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D.Tenn.) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D.Tenn.)) 
(Docket Entry No. 28) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs mo-
tion for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 
14) is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED with 
prejudice. 
This is the Final Order in this action. 
It is so ORDERED. 
ENTERED this the day of December, 2010. 
M.D.Tenn.,2010. 
Clarcor, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co. 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D.Tenn.) 
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Edward William Little, Jr., Mccarter & English, LLP, 
Boston, MA, for Welch Foods, Inc. 
Harvey Weiner, Michael P. Duffy, Alan K. Tannen-
wald, Peabody & Arnold LLP, Barbara A. O'Donnell, 
Brian P. McDonough, Stephen J. Abarbanel, Zelle 
McDonough & Cohen, LLP, Joseph S. Sano, Adam R. 
Doherty, John E. Matosky, Prince, Lobel Glovsky & 
Tye LLP, Boston, MA, for National Union Fire In-
surance Co., et al. 
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
ZOBEL, District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff, Welch Foods, Inc. ("Welch"), man-
ufactures and sells fruit juice including what it de-
scribes as "White Grape and Pomegranate" juice. In 
the forefront the label on this product prominently 
pictures pomegranates when, in fact, the primary in-
gredients are white grape and apple juice. It similarly 
describes its product in "other forms of marketing and 
advertising." See POM Wonderful LLC v. Welch 
Foods Inc., CV09-00567 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2009), f 
21. A competitor, POM Wonderful, LLC ("POM"), 
which produces its own blended pomegranate juices, 
sued Welch in 2009 for false and misleading adver-
tising. Shortly thereafter a putative class of disaffected 
consumers also brought suit against Welch for false 
advertising and deceptive labeling. Welch tendered 
these complaints (the "underlying complaints") to 
three of its insurers. Two, Zurich American Insurance 
Company ("Zurich") and National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA ("National Union"), denied 
coverage and declined to defend. The third, Axis 
Surplus Insurance Company ("Axis"), denied cover-
age under two policies, but agreed to defend under a 
third while reserving its rights. 
Plaintiff brought this suit against all three for de-
claratory judgment, breach of contract and violation of 
Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 176 and 93A. Axis has coun-
terclaimed for declaratory judgment and now all de-
fendants have moved for summary judgment; plaintiff 
has cross-moved for partial summary judgment 
against each. The policy or policies of each defendant 
provide different coverages and contain different 
exclusions. I will therefore address each defendant's 
motion separately. 
I. Analysis 
A. Legal Standard 
Under Massachusetts law, an insurer has a duty to 
defend or reimburse an insured's defense costs when, 
comparing the third-party complaint with the policy 
provisions, '"the allegations of the complaint are rea-
sonably susceptible of an interpretation that they state 
or adumbrate a claim covered by the policy terms." 
Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 17 
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Mass.App.Ct. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338 (1983) (in-
ternal citations omitted). In general, "the policyholder 
bears the initial burden of proving coverage within the 
policy description of covered risks." Markline v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 139, 140, 424 N.E.2d 
464(1981). Once the insured meets this initial burden, 
the burden shifts to the insurer, who may defeat cov-
erage by establishing applicability of one of the poli-
cy's exclusionary provisions. See B & T Masonry 
Constr. Co. v. Public Servs. Mut. Ins.. 382 F.3d 36, 39 
(1st Cir.2004). 
B. The National Union Insurance Policy 
Insofar as relevant, the National Union policy 
covers Welch's loss "arising from a Claim ... for any 
actual of alleged Wrongful Act of [Welch]." — It 
defines "[w]rongful act" as "[ ] any breach of duty, 
neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, 
omission or act by [or on behalf of the Organization]." 
Welch's Statement of Facts, H 35(2) (emphasis added). 
FN1. Policy Number 01-223-68-01 encom-
passes the period September 1, 2008 through 
September 1,2009. 
*2 Both parties have moved for summary judg-
ment, Welch on the ground it is entitled to coverage 
(Docket # 52); National Union on the ground that its 
claim is excluded (Docket # 45). National Union does 
not dispute that the underlying complaints allege a 
"wrongful act" under the policy. Assuming the alle-
gations of the underlying complaint are true, Welch's 
statements that its product contained "pomegranate 
juice" (if in reality, the juice was primarily comprised 
of apple and white grape juice) could be deemed to be 
"misleading statements]" and thus fall within the 
ambit of the policy. National Union instead disclaims 
coverage based on Exclusion 4(c) of the policy, which 
provides: 
ANTITRUST EXCLUSION 
The Insurer shall not be made liable to make any 
payment for Loss in connection with a Claim made 
against the insured: 
alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable 
to, or in any way involving either directly or indi-
rectly, antitrust violations, price fixing, price dis-
criminations, unfair competition, deceptive trade 
practices and/or monopolies, including actions, 
^ ^ Page 2 
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proceedings, claims or investigations related thereto 
Nat'l Union's L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material 
Facts, K 4 (emphasis added). 
Here, Welch is sued by POM for "unfair, un-
lawful, and fraudulent business practices" (POM 
Complaint 1 9), and by consumers for "unfair compe-
tition" (Burcham Complaint H 1) as well as making 
false statements which "actually deceive, or have a 
tendency to deceive" (POM Complaint ^ 29) or were 
"untrue, misleading and likely to deceive." (Burcham 
Complaint ^ 63). The question, then, is whether the 
underlying complaints allege claims that fall within 
the rubric of "unfair competition" or "deceptive trade 
practices" in Exclusion 4(c). The Policy defines nei-
ther term. 
Welch contends that Exclusion 4(c) applies ex-
clusively to antitrust claims for two reasons. First, it 
points to the section's header ("[antitrust exclusion") 
as evidence that the exclusion is limited to antitrust 
claims. Next, it notes that, under the well-established 
principle of construction noscitur a sociis ("known 
from its associates"), the court must construe the terms 
at issue in accordance with the surrounding words; 
here, those words relate entirely to antitrust claims. 
While the exclusion at issue is entitled "[antitrust 
exclusion," its scope is not so limited. Indeed, the very 
next exclusion in the contract, Exclusion 19, states that 
"[t]he headings in this policy are there purely for the 
convenience of the parties and they form no part of the 
definition of the scope of the coverage provided." 
Moreover, the plain language of the exclusion is broad 
enough to include a variety of anti-competitive be-
havior. Nothing in the text of the exclusion limits it 
solely to antitrust claims. To the contrary, the fact that 
it includes a range of anti-competitive conduct sug-
gests that its scope is broader than antitrust claims. 
Plaintiffs remaining arguments are equally unpersua-
sive. 
*3 Since the exclusion applies, National Union 
has no duty to defend, and no duty to advance defense 
costs. Accordingly, National Union's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Docket # 45) is ALLOWED, and 
Welch's partial motion for summary judgment 
(Docket # 52) seeking declaratory judgment on Count 
I is DENIED. 
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C. The Zurich American Insurance Policy 
The Zurich policy covers Welch's loss resulting 
from "personal and advertising injury" arising from a 
claim "for any actual or alleged Wrongful Act of 
[Welch]." Welch's Statement of Facts, J 34 — The 
Policies define "personal and advertising injury" as 
follows: 
FN2. The policies at issue are policy number 
GLO 8445677-06, covering the period Sep-
tember 1, 2006 through September 1, 2007, 
policy number GLO 844677-07, and policy 
number GLO 8445677-08, covering the pe-
riod September 1,2008 through September 1, 
2009 (the "Policies"). The Policies each have 
limits of $1 million per occurrence/$2 mil-
lion in the aggregate, and a $250,000 de-
ductible. 
injury, including consequential bodily injury, aris-
ing out of one or more of the following offenses: ... 
d. [ojral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that slanders or libels a person or organi-
zation or disparages a person's or organization's 
goods, products or services; f. [tjhe use of another's 
advertising idea in your advertisement. 
Welch's L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts, J 40 
(emphasis added). 
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. 
Welch on the ground that subsections (d) and (f) of the 
policy cover the alleged wrongs in the underlying 
complaints {see Docket # 55), and Zurich on the 
ground that they do not. (Docket # 42). 
1. Subsection (d): Written Publication that Dis-
parages 
Welch contends that there is coverage under the 
policy because both the Burcham and POM plaintiffs 
have alleged that Welch disparaged POM's product by 
falsely advertising that Welch's product contained 
pomegranate juice, and thereby damaged POM's rep-
utation. Welch further posits that the labeling and 
marketing of Welch's pomegranate juice were "written 
publication[s]" that disparaged its product under the 
terms of the policy. The POM complaint contains 
objections to specific advertisements of Welch, such 
as "[a] prominent display of pomegranates of the 
labels and packaging" and a "website where it adver-
tises and markets the misleading [Welch Pomegran-
ate] juice." — See Welch's L.R. 56.1 Statement of 
Material Facts, \\ 9-11,12. 
FN3. Welch does not contend that the alle-
gations in the Burcham complaint constitute 
disparagement. 
While the advertisements at issue here constitute 
"written publications," they did not disparage POM or 
its products by making false claims about them; rather 
Welch is alleged to have misrepresented the content of 
its own product. See, e.g., Altapac Trading Company, 
Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., No. CV97-0781 
(C.D.Cal.1997) (competing olive oil company ac-
cused competitor-insured of falsely labeling and ad-
vertising its products as "pure olive oil"; court held no 
coverage under insurance policy covering injury 
arising out of disparagement because the complaint 
alleged that the insured misrepresented its own prod-
ucts, not that the insured misrepresented competitor's 
goods). 
Nor is this a case in which one competitor is suing 
another for false claims about the superiority of its 
own products. See E.piphany, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 590 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1253-54 
(N.D.Cal.2008) (holding that the allegations of the 
underlying complaint alleged disparagement by im-
plication where the plaintiff made statements that its 
product was the "only" software product in its market 
with certain capabilities). The gravamen of the un-
derlying claim here is false advertising, not product 
disparagement. Accordingly, the claims in the under-
lying complaint are not covered by subsection (d). 
2. Subsection (f): Use of Another's Advertising 
Idea in Your Advertisement 
*4 Next, Welch contends that the allegations that 
it used POM's advertising idea as its own is covered by 
subsection (f).— 
FN4. The POM complaint alleges that Welch 
has attempted to "cash in on POM's idea of 
selling bottled pomegranate juice by mar-
keting and selling to consumers products 
labeled as 'pomegranate juice' that in fact 
contain little or no actual pomegranate 
juice." Welch's Statement of Facts, \ 9. Sim-
ilarly, the Burcham complaint alleges that 
Welch used POM's advertising idea and 
misled consumers by "naming, labeling, 
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packaging, marketing and advertising 
[Welch's juice] as [containing pomegranate 
juice]" and including the prominent display 
of Welch's Statement, U 21. See American 
Simmental Ass'n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 
F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.2002). 
The essence of the argument is that Welch has 
"used" POM's advertising idea by claiming that 
pomegranate juice is an ingredient (with the attendant 
implication that Welch's product has salutary health 
effects). However, "the phrase 'advertising idea' re-
lates to the manner in which one advertises its goods" 
and does not include the content of such advertise-
ments. Accessories Biz.. Inc. v. Linda & Jay Keane, 
Inc.. 533 F.Supp.2d 38 L 387 (S.D.N.Y.2008). The 
coverage provision is limited to Welch's use, in its 
advertisements, of POM's ideas about how to solicit 
business and customers. See Continental Cas. v. 
Consol Graphics, Inc.. 656 F.Supp.2d 650, 658-59 
(S.D.Tex.2009). Welch has not done that. 
Since the underlying complaints do not allege a 
covered offense under the Zurich policies, there is no 
duty to defend. Thus, Welch's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Docket # 55) is denied. Zurich's Motion for 
Summary Judgment with respect to Welch's declara-
tory judgment and breach of contract claims (Docket # 
42) is allowed.1211 
FN 5. Because 1 conclude that there is no 
coverage under the Zurich policies, 1 do not 
reach the question whether such coverage is 
precluded by any of their exclusions. 
D. The Axis Insurance Policy 
Axis insured Welch against two types of loss. The 
relevant policies provide that Axis will provide Media 
Wrongful Act Coverage (Coverage A) and Profes-
sional Services Wrongful Act (Coverage B).— Both 
parties have moved for summary judgment. Welch on 
the ground that the policies cover the alleged wrongs 
in the underlying complaints {see Docket # 58); Axis 
on the ground that they do not, and alternatively, that 
the alleged wrongs are expressly excluded from cov-
erage. (Docket # 47.) 
FN6. Policy Number EGN711111/01/2006 
("2006 Policy"), covered the period Sep-
tember 1, 2006 through September 1, 2007. 
The Policy was renewed for two more years. 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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See Policy No. EGN711111/01/2007 ("2007 
Policy") and EGN711111/01/2008 ("2008 
Policy"). 
1. Media Wrongful Act 
Under Coverage A, Axis agreed to pay "all Loss 
arising from any Claim for a Media Wrongful Act" 
occurring during the policy period. See Welch's 
Statement of Facts, \ 38. The agreement defines 
"Media Wrongful Act" as: 
any actual or alleged act, error or omission when 
committed or allegedly committed by an Insured ... 
in connection with the creation or dissemination of 
the Covered Media, or in connection with the crea-
tion or dissemination of Advertising Material re-
lating to the Covered Media, including but not lim-
ited to any of the following: [ ] disparagement, or 
any other form of defamation or harm to the char-
acter or reputation of any ... entity; misappropria-
tion of... information or ideas; error or omission in 
[c]ontent.... 
Welch's Statement of Material Facts, ^ 39 (em-
phasis added). "Covered Media," in turn, is defined as 
the "[c]ontent of the publications, programs, films, 
broadcasts, internet sites ... including any electronic or 
digital versions...." Id. at \ 40. It broadly includes 
internet content. "Content" is defined as "any com-
municative material" excluding several exceptions 
relating to the delivery of such content. Id. at j^ 43. 
*5 Welch contends that the allegations of the 
POM and Burcham complaints fit the requirements for 
coverage under this provision. Those allegations are 
that Welch's labeling and marketing its pomegranate 
juice was an act, error or omission made in connection 
with the creation or dissemination of advertising ma-
terial relating to Covered Media, and it both (1) dis-
paraged POM, and (2) misappropriated POM's in-
formation or ideas. 
The argument presents several difficulties. First, 
the underlying allegations do not arise from "errors or 
omissions in content... in connection with the creation 
or dissemination o f covered media or advertising 
material. That is, the underlying complaints do not 
allege loss arising from the creation or dissemination 
of Welch's advertising material, only from the content 
thereof. Second, the underlying complaints do not 
claim "disparagement, or any other form of defama-
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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tion or harm to the character or reputation" of POM. 
To the contrary, the complaints allege that Welch 
marketed and sold a product that was not what was 
advertised. Welch mentions no competitors in its 
advertisements. Welch's alleged misrepresentations 
concern the contents and quality of its own product 
and imply nothing about the content or quality of 
POM's product. Nothing about the allegation implies 
harm to POM's reputation or character. Third, for the 
same reasons discussed above (see discussion re-
garding Zurich Policy, Section LB.2, infra ), the un-
derlying complaints do not involve "misappropriation 
of information or ideas"; nor do they involve the 
misappropriation of POM's advertising idea, as Welch 
contends. For these reasons, the underlying com-
plaints are not covered by the Policies. 
2. Professional Services Wrongful Act 
Under Coverage B, Axis has a duty to pay "all 
Loss arising from any Claim first made against 
[Welch] during the Policy Period ... for a Professional 
Services Wrongful Act..." Welch's L .R. 56.1 State-
ment of Material Facts U 47. The Policy defines 
"Professional Services Wrongful Act" as: 
any actual or alleged negligent act, error or omission 
committed or attempted solely in the performance 
of or failure to perform Professional Services by 
any Insured in his, her or its capacity as such.... 
Id. at H 48 (emphasis added). "Professional Ser-
vices," in turn, is defined as "promotional and mar-
keting services," including electronic and internet 
advertising. Id.— 
FN7. "Professional Services" were initially 
defined as services which were "performed 
for others for a fee or other consideration or 
remuneration; and identified in Item 6 of the 
Declaration, including any such services that 
are performed electronically using the inter-
net or a network of two or more computers." 
Welch's L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material 
Facts % 49. Only the latter portion of that 
definition (referencing Item 6) was included 
in the 2008 policy. Item 6 of the Declaration 
defines "Professional Services" as 
"[promotional and marketing services." 
The question here is whether the false advertising 
claims that arise out of plaintiffs complaint fall under 
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the definition of "promotional and marketing ser-
vices." The underlying allegations here do not fit 
"Professional Services Wrongful Act" for two rea-
sons. First, this provision is usually intended to pro-
vide liability protection for insureds whose clients hire 
them to provide professional services. See Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Reins. Co., 796 F.Supp. 275, 
280-281 (S.D.Ohio 1991) ("[a]n errors and omissions 
policy is intended to insure a member of a designated 
calling against liability arising out of the mistakes 
inherent in the practice of that particular profession or 
business") (internal citations omitted). Second, pro-
fessional services coverage is not intended to cover 
claims by competitors. Such claims pertain to how the 
insured does business rather than breach of profes-
sional duties. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1097, 1102 (3d Cir.1995). 
*6 Accordingly, Welch's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Count II of the Second 
Amended Complaint (Docket # 58) is DENIED. Axis' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 47) is 
ALLOWED. 
II. Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, Welch's Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment against defendant 
insurance companies Axis, National Union, and Zur-
ich (Docket52, 55, 58) are each DENIED. The de-
fendant insurance companies' respective Motions for 
Summary Judgment (Docket42, 45, 47) are each 
ALLOWED. Judgment may be entered accordingly. 
D.Mass.,2010. 
Welch Foods, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3928704 (D.Mass.), 2010-2 
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United States District Court, 
D. Minnesota. 
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBINSON OUTDOORS, INC., Defendant. 
Civil No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG). 
Nov. 17,2011. 
Eric J. Steinhoff and Brian A. Wood, Lind Jensen 
Sullivan & Peterson, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for 
plaintiff/counter defendant. 
Michael C. Mahoney, Mahoney Anderson LLC, 
Wayzata, MN, for defendant/counter claimant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge. 
*1 After consumers sued Robinson Outdoors, Inc. 
("Robinson") in multiple jurisdictions for false rep-
resentations of the attributes of odor-eliminating 
clothing ("underlying actions"), Robinson sought 
defense and indemnification from Westfield Insurance 
Co ("Westfield"), which was denied. In this action, 
Westfield seeks a declaratory judgment that it is not 
obligated to defend and indemnify Robinson for the 
underlying actions. The Court will grant summary 
judgment to Westfield because the claims in the un-
derlying consumer actions against Robinson are not 
covered by the Westfield insurance policies or are 
specifically excluded.from the policies. Robinson's 
summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of 
Westfield's affirmative defenses to Robinson's coun-
terclaims and Westfield's motion to exclude testimony 
will both be denied as moot. 
BACKGROUND 
I. ROBINSON 
Robinson is a Delaware corporation formed in 
2002 that sold odor eliminating products, clothing, 
and hunting gear. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J. at 1, Docket No. 216.) — Although 
Robinson ceased doing business in 2005, it operates 
today as Robinson Outdoor Products, LLC. (Id.) 
FNL Although the Court cites to several 
documents that were filed under seal, the 
Court has not used any of the underlying 
material encompassed by the protective order 
(Docket No. 124). Therefore, this Order is 
not filed under seal. 
Robinson sold its odor eliminating products under 
a license granted by ALS Enterprises, Inc. ("ALS"). 
(Id at 3.) Under the license, Robinson was contractu-
ally obligated to use the advertising, logos, brands and 
marks provided by ALS, and ALS created or approved 
all Robinson advertising. (Id.) 
II. UNDERLYING ACTIONS/COMPLAINTS 
In 2009, consumers sued Robinson — (along 
with several other parties, including ALS) in multiple 
jurisdictions. (Compl. at 3, Docket No. 1; CompL, Ex. 
B, Docket No. 1-5 to 1-8 [hereinafter "underlying 
complaints"].) The consumers bought Robinson's 
hunting clothing based on representations regarding 
the clothing's ability to eliminate odor. (Compl. at 
3-4). The complaints alleged that Robinson falsely 
represented the attributes of odor-eliminating cloth-
ing, deceiving consumers into purchasing the clothing. 
(PL's Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Docket No. 223.) 
FN2. The complaints originally named 
Robinson Outdoors, Inc. f/k/a Robinson 
Laboratories, Inc. as a defendant. (Compl., 
Ex. B, Underlying Compls., Docket No. 1-5 
to 1-8.) Robinson Outdoor Products, LLC 
was later added as an additional defendant in 
amended complaints. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. 
of its Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 5.) 
Robinson summarized the claims of the under-
lying complaints in this way: 
In [the class action complaint by Jonathan] Lange, 
the plaintiff contended he had five separate counts 
... (1) false advertising in violation of California 
Business & Professions Code -5 § 17500; — (2) 
violations of the California Consumer Legal Rem-
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edies Act; Civil Code § 1750, et seq.; — (3) viola-
tions of the California Business and Professions 
Code § 17200; — (4) violations of common law 
unjust enrichment; — and (5) civil conspiracy.— 
FN3. "Defendants' advertisements for De-
fendants' odor eliminating clothing contain 
untrue or misleading statements concerning 
the quality of Defendants' advertised prod-
ucts. The actual odor eliminating capability 
of Defendants' odor eliminating clothing is 
much less, if any, than Defendants repre-
sented.... Defendants knew, or, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have known 
that the statements ... were false and mis-
leading." (Compl., Ex. B, Lange Compl. Iffi 
118, 121, Docket No. 1-5.) 
FN4. "Defendants violated Civil Code § 
1770(a)(7) because they falsely and uni-
formly represented to consumers that the 
purported odor eliminating clothing was of 
the particular standard described in their 
advertising and marketing materials, i.e., 
they uniformly represented that the clothing 
eliminated odor and could be 'reactivated' 
when neither was true." (Lange Compl. ^ 
140.) 
FN5. "Unlawful, as proscribed by Cal. Bus. 
& Prof.Code § 17500, in that Defendants' 
advertisements contain unfair, deceptive, 
untrue or misleading statements of material 
fact which were and are known by Defend-
ants, or which by the exercise of reasonable 
care should be known to be untrue or mis-
leading...." (Lange Compl. % 153 .) 
and "concerning their odor eliminating 
clothing." (Lange Compl. ffl[ 168-172.) 
The complaints in the other Five Actions make the 
same factual allegations but tailor their consumer 
actions to the particular state where the action is 
filed. 
(Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. at 20.) Each 
claim in the underlying complaints depends, at least 
in part, on the Defendants' misrepresentations of the 
odor-eliminating capabilities of their products. 
*2 Robinson sought defense and indemnification 
from Westfield for the underlying actions under in-
surance policies it had purchased from Westfield. 
(PL's Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2.) Westfield denied 
coverage on multiple grounds. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. 
Partial Summ. J. at 5.) First, Westfield asserted that 
the allegations of the underlying complaints did not 
fall within its policies. (Id.) Second, Westfield con-
tended two exclusions in the policies barred cover-
age—specifically (1) that the advertisements were 
published prior to the policy period and (2) that the 
injuries alleged in the underlying complaints arose 
from the failure of Robinson's products to conform 
with statements of quality or performance made in 
Robinson's advertisements. (See id.) 
Robinson and Robinson Outdoor Products, LLC 
eventually settled the claims in the underlying actions 
with a sealed settlement agreement that was reduced to 
formal written agreements in June 2010. (Aff. of Eric 
J. Steinhoff, June 1, 2011, Ex. 7, Stipulated Confi-
dential Final Order for Settlement (Monetary Terms) 
at 1-2, Docket No. 224.) After settlement, Westfield 
again refused Robinson's request for indemnification. 
(Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. at 5.) 
FN6. "Defendants knowingly advertised and 
sold to Plaintiff and members of the Class 
clothing that was not as Defendants repre-
sented.... As a result ... Defendants have re-
alized substantial revenues...." (Lange 
Compl. HH 162-63.) 
FN7. Alleging that Defendants conspired to 
misrepresent the odor-eliminating properties 
of their clothing in advertisements and the 
"conspiracy was furthered and protected by 
each Defendant's knowledge of the misrep-
resentations being made by other defendants" 
III. WESTFIELDS INSURANCE POLICIES 
At issue in this case is whether the terms of the 
insurance policies issued by Westfield cover the at-
torney and settlement costs of the underlying actions. 
Westfield issued two Commercial General Liability 
insurance policies to Robinson, effective December 
30, 2004 to December 30, 2005 and December 30, 
2005 to December 30, 2006 ("Westfield Policies"). 
(Compl. at 2 & Corrected Ex. A, Insurance Policies.) 
The policy effective from December 30, 2004 to De-
cember 30, 2005 also contained umbrella coverage. 
(id.) 
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The General Liability Coverage Form contains 
the following provisions: 
SECTION I—COVERAGES ... 
COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTIS-
ING INJURY LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damaged because of 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this 
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking those 
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend 
the insured against any suit seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this in-
surance does not apply.... 
2. Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
b. Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral and written publication of material, if done at 
the direction of the insured with knowledge of its 
falsity. 
c. Material Published Prior to Policy Period 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral or written publication of material whose first 
publication took place before the beginning of the 
policy period.... 
g. Quality Or Performance Of Goods—Failure 
To Conform To Standards 
*3 "Personal and advertising injury" arising out 
of the failure of goods, products or services to 
conform with any statement of quality or 
performance made in your "advertisement".... 
SECTION V—DEFINITIONS 
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast 
or published to the general public or specific market 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
segments about your goods, products or services for 
the purpose of attracting customers or supporters.... 
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, 
including consequential "bodily injury", arising out 
of one or more of the following offenses:... 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that slanders or libels a person or or-
ganization or disparages a person's or organiza-
tion's goods, products or services;... 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
"advertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress 
or slogan in your "advertisement". 
(Compl., Corrected Ex. A, Insurance Policies, 
Docket No. 1-10 at 29, 33-34, 40, 43 (emphasis 
added).) 
The umbrella coverage policy effective Decem-
ber 30, 2004 to December 30, 2005 contains the fol-
lowing provisions: 
SECTION I—COVERAGES ... 
1. INSURING AGREEMENT 
(1) We will pay "ultimate net loss" in excess of the 
"retained limit" that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal 
injury" or "property damage" to which this insur-
ance applies. We will have the right and duty to 
defend the insured against any suit seeking those 
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend 
the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"personal injury" or "property damage" to which 
this insurance does not apply.... 
(2) This insurance applies only if the "personal 
injury" or "property damage" occurs during the 
policy period and is caused by "an occurrence" and 
prior to the policy period, no insured ... knew 
that the "personal injury" or "property dam-
age" had occurred ... 
(3) "Personal injury" or "property damage" which 
occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to 
the policy period, known to have occurred by any 
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insured listed under Paragraph 1. of Section 
II—Who Is An Insured ... 
(4) "Personal injury" or "property damage" will be 
deemed to have been known to have occurred at the 
earliest time when any insured listed under Para-
graph 1. of Section II-Who Is An Insured or any 
"employee" authorized by you to give or receive 
notice of an "occurrence" or claim" 
(1) Reports all, or any part, of the "personal injury" 
or "property damage" to us or any other insurer. 
(2) Received a written or verbal demand or claim for 
damages because of the "personal injury" or 
"property damage"; or 
(3) Becomes aware by any other means that "per-
sonal injury" or "property damage" has occurred or 
has begun to occur.... 
2. EXCLUSIONS ... 
f. Personal And Advertising Injury 
*4 This insurance does not apply to: 
(2) Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral and written publication of material, if done at 
the direction of the insured with knowledge of its 
falsity. 
(3) Material Published Prior To Policy Period 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral or written publication of material whose first 
publication took place before the beginning of the 
policy period.... 
(7) Quality Or Performance of Goods—Failure 
To Conform To Statements 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
the failure of goods, products or services to 
conform with any statement of quality or 
performance made in your "advertisement".... 
SECTION V—DEFINITIONS ... 
16. "Occurrence" means an accident or offense re-
sulting in "personal injury" or "property damage". 
b. With respect to subsections b., c, e., f, g., and h. 
of the definition of "personal injury", an offense 
includes a series of offenses of the same or similar 
nature. 
c. With respect to subsections e., f, g., and h. of the 
definition of "personal injury", an offense includes 
a series of offenses in which the same or similar 
advertising material is used regardless of the num-
ber or kind of media used. 
All "personal injury" and "property damage" re-
sulting from an accident or offense shall be con-
sidered as resulting from one "occurrence".... 
17. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury 
... arising out of one or more of the following of-
fenses: ... 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that slanders or libels a person or or-
ganization or disparages a personfs or organiza-
tion's goods, products or services; 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
"advertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress 
or slogan in your "advertisement". 
24. "Suit" means a civil proceeding in which dam-
ages because of "personal injury" or "property 
damage" to which this insurance applies are alleged 
(Id. at Docket No. 1-12 at 3-4, 6, 14, 16-18 (em-
phasis added).) 
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION 
In January 2010, Westfield filed this action 
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to 
defend or indemnify Robinson in the underlying ac-
tions. (Docket No. 1.) In February 2010, Robinson 
brought a counterclaim seeking coverage and mone-
A
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tary damages for Westfield's breach of contract for 
failing to defend and indemnify Robinson in the un-
derlying actions.— (Docket Nos. 7, 19.) Westfield 
answered by alleging nine affirmative defenses. 
(Docket No. 35.) 
FN8. Robinson also brought a bad faith claim 
(Docket No. 7) which it later attempted to 
revise to a breach of contract claim (Docket 
No. 19). This Court dismissed that claim. 
(Docket No. 33.) 
ANALYSIS 
I. WESTFIELD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON DUTY TO DEFEND 
Westfield has now moved for summary judgment 
against Robinson, seeking a declaration that Westfield 
has no duty to defend or indemnify Robinson in the 
underlying actions. The Court finds that the Westfield 
Policies do not cover the underlying claims. Moreo-
ver, even if there were coverage for the underlying 
claims, the Court finds the claims are excluded from 
coverage by specific exclusions in the Westfield Pol-
icies. Accordingly, the Court will grant Westfield's 
motion. 
A. Standard of Review 
*5 Summary judgment is appropriate where there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material 
if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a dispute 
is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a 
reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 
(1986). A court considering a motion for summary 
judgment must view the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to the non-moving party and give that party 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 
Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
B. Westfield Policies' Coverage of the Claims 
A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction 
construes an insurance contract in accordance with 
state law. Lanzley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 841, 
844 (8th Cir. 1993). The parties agree that Minnesota 
law governs this action. Un der Minnesota law, an 
insurer's obligation to defend is contractual. Mead-
owbrook Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411,415 
(Minn. 1997). Interpretation of an insurance policy is a 
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matter of law. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington 
Steel & Supply Co.. 718 N.W .2d 888, 894 
(Minn.2006). If the language of the insurance contract 
is unambiguous, it is given its plain and ordinary 
meaning; if the language is ambiguous, it is construed 
narrowly against the insurer. Id. Robinson, as the 
insured, bears the initial burden of establishing cov-
erage, and Westfield, as the insurer, bears the burden 
of demonstrating that a policy exclusion applies. See 
id 
At issue is whether any of the claims in the un-
derlying actions are covered by the Westfield Policies. 
See AMCO Ins. Co. y. Inspired Techs. Inc., 648 F.3d 
875, 880(8thCir.2011) (noting that under Minnesota 
law, the duty to defend even a single claim "creates a 
duty to defend all claims"). In order for coverage to 
attach, the underlying complaints must allege one of 
the types of "personal or advertising injury" covered 
by the Westfield Policies. Robinson argues that the 
underlying complaints sufficiently allege two types of 
covered "personal or advertising injury" because they 
allege that Robinson published advertising material 
that libeled, slandered or disparaged the goods and 
products of other manufacturers and that Robinson 
used the advertising ideas of another. 
1. Libel, Slander or Disparagement 
Robinson asserts that coverage should attach be-
cause the underlying complaints allege sufficient facts 
to establish a claim for defamation (either libel or 
slander) or disparagement. The Westfield Policies 
provide coverage for "Personal or advertising injury... 
arising out of one or more of the following offenses:... 
Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material 
that slanders or libels a person or organiza tion or 
disparages a person's or organization's goods, products 
or services.'" (Insurance Policies, Docket No. 1-10 at 
43.) The Court finds that the Westfield Policies do not 
provide coverage because the underlying complaints 
did not bring a claim for libel, slander, or disparage-
ment; and the complaints were brought by consumers, 
not Robinson's competitors. 
*6 Critically, Robinson fails to identify any claim 
in the underlying complaints that explicitly alleges 
slander, libel or disparagement. Because "the under-
lying factual circumstances recited by a plaintiff ... 
should not be converted into possible, but not asserted, 
causes of action," a factual assertion in a complaint 
without a claim is not sufficient to give rise to cov-
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erage. Id. at 1134; see also Ross v. Briggs and Mor-
gan, 540 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 1995) (holding that 
taking allegations pled to allege one claim and 
equating them with an unpled claim is "to engage in a 
far too generous reading of the complaint"). Although 
Robinson points to an allegation in the Lange com-
plaint that the defendants "disparage[d] those that 
disagreed with their claims" (Lange Compl. at ^ 90.), 
no claim in any of the underlying complaints pled 
slander, libel or disparagement. Cf. Miller v. ACE 
USA. 261 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1133 (D.Minn.2003) 
(noting that a court must focus on the claims that are 
pled, not the conduct being asserted to prove the 
claims). 
Furthermore, Robinson fails to identify any as-
sertion in the underlying complaints that a defamatory 
statement harmed the plaintiffs' reputations. "To 
establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove 
three elements: (1) the defamatory statement is 
'communicated to someone other than the plaintiff,' 
(2) the statement is false, and (3) the statement 
ctend[s] to harm the plaintiffs reputation and to lower 
[the plaintiff] in the estimation of the community.' " 
Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 
919-20 (Minn.2009) (quoting Steumpges v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.l980)V 
Because the plaintiffs in the underlying actions did not 
plead damage to their reputations, they would be un-
able to plead a defamation claim. Consequently, 
Robinson has not met its burden of showing that the 
underlying complaints should elicit coverage because 
they allege defamation. 
Robinson also contends the underlying com-
plaints allege that sales of the defendants' 
odor-eliminating products were enhanced by defend-
ants' disparagement of other manufacturers of 
odor-dampening hunting clothing. However, in order 
to be actionable, defamatory words must refer to the 
plaintiff. See MSK EyEs Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
NaflAss'n 546 F.3d 533, 542 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting 
Brill v. Minn. Mines, 21A N.W.2d 631, 633 
(Minn. 1937)). Because the underlying actions were 
brought by consumers, not other manufacturers, the 
underlying complaints cannot be interpreted to state a 
claim for disparagement against the manufacturers. 
The Court concludes that Robinson has failed to 
demonstrate that the Westfield Policies should apply 
because the injury to Robinson arose from slander, 
libel, or disparagement. 
2. Use of "Another's Advertising Idea" 
Robinson also asserts that the Westfield Policies 
apply because the underlying complaints concern the 
veracity of its advertising. Because Robinson's adver-
tising was provided by ALS, Robinson asserts its 
injury arose from the "use of another's advertising 
idea." The Westfield Policies define covered "per-
sonal or advertising injury" as "injury ... arising out of 
one or more of the following offenses: ... The use of 
another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'." 
(Insurance Policies, Docket No. 1-10 at 43 (emphasis 
added).) The Court finds that Robinson has not used 
another's advertising idea within the meaning of the 
Westfield Policies. 
*7 Other courts have interpreted the offense of 
using of "another's advertising idea" to mean the 
"wrongful taking of the manner by which another 
advertises its goods or services." Champion Labs., 
Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 09-C-7251, 
2010 WL 2649848, at *5 fN.D. 111. June 30, 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Green-
wich Ins. Co. v. RPS Prods., Inc., 882 N.E.2d 1202, 
1211 (Ill.App.Ct.2008) (finding that use of an adver-
tising idea requires misappropriation of the adver-
tising ideas or style of doing business).— Robinson's 
use of ALS's advertising ideas was not wrongful and 
did not constitute an offense because it was done un-
der a license granted by ALS. 
FN9. Westfield presents no case law to 
support its assertion that this language would 
cover the licensed use of another's advertis-
ing idea. Moreover, the underlying com-
plaints did not allege that Robinson took the 
advertising ideas of any of the plaintiffs in 
the underlying actions. See, e.g., 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. 
Co., 772 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1003 ( S.D.Ind. 
2011) ("We are hard-pressed to under-
stand how use of a co-defendant's idea, as 
opposed to one of the plaintiff[']s, could be 
considered an 'offense.' "). 
Robinson further alleges that the Westfield Poli-
cies' language was ambiguous and should be con-
strued narrowly and strictly against Westfield. To the 
extent that Robinson identified an ambiguity, it asserts 
that particular terms within the Westfield Policies are 
undefined.^^ The Court finds, upon reviewing the 
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Westfield Policies' language as a whole, that the 
clause's language, when read in context, is unambig-
uous and refers to the misappropriation of another's 
advertising idea. See Smitke v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
118 N.W.2d 217, 218 (Minn. 1962) ("[T]he pertinent 
provisions must be read and studied independently 
and in context with all relevant provisions and the 
language of the policy as a whole.") The Court con-
cludes that Robinson has failed to demonstrate that the 
Westfield Policies should apply because injury to 
Robinson arose out the "use of another's advertising 
idea." 
FN10. Specifically, Robinson asserts the 
clause is ambiguous because "advertising" 
"advertising idea" "first publication" "oral" 
"material" and "written" are not defined in 
the Westfield Policies. 
C. The Underlying Claims are Specifically Ex-
cluded from Coverage 
Even if Robinson had met its burden of estab-
lishing coverage under the Westfield Policies, the 
claims in the underlying complaints are specifically 
excluded from coverage by the policy exclusion for 
"Quality Or Performance of Goods-Failure To Con-
form To Statements." — The "Failure to Conform" 
clause states, "This insurance does not apply to ... 
'personal and advertising injury' arising out of the 
failure of goods, products, and services to conform 
with any statement of quality or performance made in 
your 'advertisement.' " (Insurance Policies, Docket 
No. 1-10 at 33-34 & Docket No. 1-12 at 6.) The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that if "the policy 
contains an exclusion clause," the burden is on the 
insurer "to prove the applicability of the exclusion...." 
SCSC Corp. v. AlliedMut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 
313 (Minn. 1995). "Exclusions are narrowly inter-
preted against the insurer." Id. 
FN11. Westfield also asserts that coverage is 
barred under the Westfield Policies under the 
policy exclusion for "Material Published 
Prior to the Policy Period." Although West-
field provided examples of advertisements 
like those complained of in the underlying 
complaints that were published before the 
coverage date (Steinhoff Aff., Ex. 3 & Ex. 4), 
it is not clear that every type of advertisement 
complained of was published prior to the 
policy period. Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to Robinson, this exclusion is 
not broad enough to exclude all claims in the 
underlying complaints. 
All of the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in the 
underlying complaints relate to Robinson's products' 
failure to conform to statements concerning the per-
formance of the products. In Minnesota, a court is 
instructed to focus on the "claims set forth, not the 
'conduct being asserted to prove the claim [s].'" 
Miller, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1133 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Meadowbrook, 559 N.W.2d at 420). Robin-
son asserts that there are statements in the underlying 
complaints that do not allege the products failed to 
perform as advertised. However, because the claims 
asserted by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaints 
all relate to failure to conform with quality or per-
formance, other factual assertions in the underlying 
complaints do not matter. 
*8 In sum, even if the Court was to find that 
Robinson had met its burden of establishing coverage 
under the Westfield Policies, Westfield has adequately 
demonstrated that the claims in the underlying com-
plaints are excluded from coverage by the failure to 
conform exclusion. As a result, the Court will grant 
summary judgment to Westfield. 
II. ROBINSON'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In response to Robinson's counterclaim seeking 
insurance coverage and monetary damages for West-
field's failure to defend and indemnify it, Westfield 
filed nine affirmative defenses. In its motion for par-
tial summary judgment, Robinson requests dismissal 
of all of Westfield's affirmative defenses. Because 
Westfield is entitled to summary judgment, the Court 
need not resolve the motion and will deny it as moot. 
III. WESTFIELD'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
Westfield has moved to exclude the expert tes-
timony of Aaron Hasler and Scott Shultz. Because 
Westfield is entitled to summary judgment, the Court 
will deny this motion as moot. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, and the files, records, and 
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
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[Docket No. 221] is GRANTED. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
[Docket No. 214] is DENIED as moot. 
3. Plaintiff s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony 
[Docket No. 225] is DENIED as moot. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED AC-
CORDINGLY. 
D.Minn.,2011. 
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc. 
Slip Copy, 2011 WL 5593171 (D.Minn.) 
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H 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit. 
TRAILER BRIDGE, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
an Illinois corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 10-13913. 
Sept. 19,2011. 
Background: Freight company sued insurer, alleging 
that it breached commercial general liability (CGL) 
policy by failing to defend it in underlying antitrust 
action. The United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida, No. 3:09-cv-01135-HES-MCR, 
Harvey E. Schlesinger, J., 2010 WL 2927424, granted 
summary judgment in insurer's favor. Insured ap-
pealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals held that CEO's al-
legedly misleading statement made in interview aimed 
at investors and describing general market conditions 
did not trigger duty to defend insured in antitrust ac-
tion under "personal and advertising injury" provision 
in CGL policy. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
HI Insurance 217 €^>2298 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2298 k. In general Most Cited 
Cases 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most 
Cited Cases 
CEO's allegedly misleading statement made in 
interview aimed at investors and describing general 
market conditions did not trigger duty to defend in-
sured in antitrust action under "personal and adver-
tising injury" provision in commercial general liability 
(CGL) policy, as it did not deploy the advertising idea 
of "another"; policy defined "advertising injury" as 
one arising from "(t)he use of another's advertising 
idea in your 'advertisement,' " and use of codefend-
ant's and alleged coconspirator's idea, as opposed to 
idea of plaintiff in underlying antitrust action, could 
not qualify as "offense" under policy. 
121 Insurance 217 €=^1863 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XHKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl863 k. Questions of law or fact. Most 
Cited Cases 
When essential facts of case are not in dispute, it 
is appropriate for district court to interpret insurance 
contract to determine whether any ambiguities exist as 
matter of law. 
0 1 Federal Courts 170B €^>373 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision 
170BVKA) In General 
170Bk373 k. Substance or procedure; de-
terminativeness. Most Cited Cases 
Federal Courts 170B €==>387 
Insurance 217 €>^2301 
217 Insurance 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision 
170BVKB) Decisions of State Courts as Au-
thority 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated O R, ay contain errors.
Page 2 
i 
657 F.3d 1135,2011-2 Trade Cases P 77,665, 23 Fla. L„ 
(Cite as: 657 F.3d 1135) 
170Bk387 k. Federal constitution and laws. 
Most Cited Cases 
In diversity actions, federal court must apply 
substantive law of state in which it sits, except in 
matters governed by Federal Constitution or by act of 
Congress. 28U.S.C.A. § 1332. 
1£ Federal Courts 170B €^>391 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision 
170BVIfB) Decisions of State Courts as Au-
thority 
170Bk388 Federal Decision Prior to State 
Decision 
170Bk391 k. Sources of authority; as-
sumptions permissible. Most Cited Cases 
In absence of precedents from Florida's courts 
construing commercial general liability policy, federal 
court sitting in diversity could consider case law of 
other jurisdictions that had examined similar policy 
provisions to determine issues of state law as it be-
lieved Florida Supreme Court would. 
151 Insurance 217 € ^ 1 8 1 0 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XHKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl810 k. Construction as a whole. Most 
Cited Cases 
In insurance coverage cases under Florida law, 
courts look at insurance policy as whole and give 
every provision its full meaning and operative effect. 
161 Insurance 217 €^>1807 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl807 k. Function of, and limitations on, 
courts, in general. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 
217 Insurance 
Fed. C 416 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl822 k. Plain, ordinary or popular 
sense of language. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 €=>1832(1) 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiar-
ies; Disfavoring Insurers 
217kl832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or 
Conflict 
217kl832(l) k. In general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 €=>1832(2) 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiar-
ies; Disfavoring Insurers 
217kl832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or 
Conflict 
217kl832(2) k. Necessity of ambigu-
ity. Most£ited_Cases 
Insurance 217 € = 1 8 3 6 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl836 k. Favoring coverage or indem-
nity; disfavoring forfeiture. Most Cited Cases 
Under Florida law, insurance contracts are con-
strued according to their plain meaning, and ambigui-
ties are construed against insurer and in favor of cov-
erage; however, the provision must actually be am-
biguous, and courts are not permitted to rewrite con-
tracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise 
reach results contrary to intentions of parties. 
HI Insurance 217 €=>2914 
217 Insurance 
217XXIII Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
^ i _ - _ . J.^ /~u.:« TTC n^r W™-Vc 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 3 
657 F.3d 1135,2011-2 Trade Cases P 77,665,23 Fla. L. 
(Cite as: 657 F.3d 1135) 
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 €^>2915 
217 Insurance 
217XXHI Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2915 k. Matters beyond pleadings. 
Most Cited Cases 
In Florida, general rule is that insurance compa-
ny's duty to defend insured is determined solely from 
allegations in complaint against insured, not by true 
facts of cause of action against insured, insured's ver-
sion of facts or insured's defenses. 
181 Insurance 217 €==>2914 
217 Insurance 
217XXIH Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 €^>2922(1) 
217 Insurance 
217XXHI Duty to Defend 
217k2920 Scope of Duty 
217k2922 Several Grounds or Causes of 
Action 
217k2922(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under Florida law, insurer must provide defense 
in underlying action if complaint states facts that bring 
injury within policy's coverage, and if complaint al-
leges facts partially within and partially outside scope 
of coverage, then insurer is obligated to defend entire 
suit. 
121 Insurance 217 €^>2913 
217 Insurance 
217XXHI Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2913 k. In general; standard. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under Florida law, merits of underlying suit have 
Fed. C 416 
no bearing on whether duty to defend is owed by 
insurer. 
[101 Insurance 217 €^>2913 
217 Insurance 
217XXHI Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2913 k. In general; standard. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under Florida law, any doubt about duty to de-
fend must be resolved in favor of insured. 
fill Insurance 217 €^>2914 
217 Insurance 
217XXIII Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases 
Under Florida law, with regard to determining 
duty to defend, coverage is determined from examin-
ing most recent amended pleading, not original 
pleading. 
[121 Insurance 217 €==>2298 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2298 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under Florida law, inclusion in newspaper article 
covering multiple topics ranging from what types of 
assets company owned and description of its services 
to chief executive officer's (CEO's) general outlook on 
relevant market of quotations from company's CEO 
which happened to be beneficial to company did not 
transform article into "advertisement" for company 
that would trigger insurer's duty to defend under 
"personal and advertising injury" provision in com-
mercial general liability (CGL) policy. 
1131 Insurance 217 € ^ 2 3 0 1 
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217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under Florida insurance law, "advertising idea" 
means any idea or concept related to the promotion of 
a product to the public; put another way, "advertising 
idea" is concept about manner product is promoted to 
the public. 
114] Insurance 217 €=>2301 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under Florida insurance law, even assuming that 
brief explanation provided in freight company execu-
tive's statement in newspaper article of factors af-
fecting price in entire Puerto Rican cabotage market 
amounted to an "advertising idea," antitrust complaint 
failed to allege it belonged to another as would trigger 
insurer's duty to defend company in antitrust action 
under "personal and advertising injury" provision in 
commercial general liability (CGL) policy. 
1151 Insurance 217 € ^ 2 9 1 4 
217 Insurance 
217XXIH Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases 
Courts need not stretch allegations of complaint 
beyond reason to impose duty to defend on insurer. 
[161 Insurance 217 €=^2914 
217 Insurance 
217XX1II Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases 
Fed. C 416 
Insurance 217 €=>2915 
217 Insurance 
217XXIII Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2915 k. Matters beyond pleadings. 
Most Cited Cases 
Courts must look to underlying complaint to de-
termine insurer's duty to defend, not true facts of cause 
of action against insured or insured's version of facts. 
[171 Insurance 217 €^>1832(2) 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction 
217kl830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiar-
ies; Disfavoring Insurers 
217kl832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or 
Conflict 
217kl832(2) k. Necessity of ambigu-
ity. Most£jted_Cases 
Rule that an insurance policy should be inter-
preted liberally in favor of the insured applies only 
when there is more than one reasonable interpretation. 
[181 Insurance 217 € ^ 2 3 0 1 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most 
Cited Cases 
Even if antitrust complaint alleged "advertising 
injury" within meaning of commercial general liabil-
ity (CGL) policy, the injury did not cause antitrust 
plaintiffs' damages, obligating CGL insurer to defend 
insured freight company in antitrust action, because 
antitrust plaintiffs sought relief only for antitrust vio-
lations, not for misappropriation of advertising idea. 
[191 Insurance 217 €^>2914 
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217 Insurance 
217XXIII Duty to Defend 
217k2912 Determination of Duty 
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases 
Theories advanced and labels used in complaint 
are subordinate to facts alleged for purpose of deter-
mining duty to defend. 
[201 Insurance 217 €==>2268 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKA) In General 
217k2267 Insurer's Duty to Indemnify in 
General 
217k2268 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Court's determination that insurer has no duty to 
defend requires finding that there is no duty to in-
demnify. 
*1137 David A. Gauntlett, James A. Lowe, Andrew 
M. Sussman, Gauntlett & Associates, Irvine, CA, Alan 
S. Wachs, Volpe, Bajalia, Wickes, Rogerson & 
Wachs, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Barbara I. Michaelides, James F. Baffa, Daniel I 
Graham, Jr., Mary F. Licari, Laura A. McArdle, 
Richard H. Nicolaides, Jr., Agelo L. Reppas, Bates, 
Carey, Nicolaides, LLP, Chicago, IL, Latasha A. 
Garrison-Fullwood, Bradley R. Johnson, Taylor, Day, 
Currie, Boyd & Johnson, Jacksonville, FL, for De-
fendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida. 
Before HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and 
VINSON,^ District Judge. 
FN* Honorable C. Roger Vinson, United 
States District Judge for the Northern District 
of Florida, sitting by designation. 
PER CURIAM: 
Trailer Bridge, Inc., appeals the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant 
Illinois National Insurance Co. on Plaintiff Trailer 
Bridge's complaint alleging that Illinois National 
failed to defend Trailer Bridge in an underlying anti-
trust action and thereby breached its commercial 
general liability insurance policy (the "Policy") issued 
to Trailer Bridge for the year July 2004 to July 2005. 
Subject to certain conditions, Illinois National 
agreed in the Policy to pay any sums that Trailer 
Bridge became legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of "personal and advertising injury" and to 
defend Trailer Bridge against any suit seeking such 
damages. The Policy defines "personal and advertis-
ing injury" as "injury, including consequential 'bodily 
injury,' arising out of... [t]he use of another's adver-
tising idea in your 'advertisement.' " Although failing 
to define "advertising idea," the Policy defines "ad-
vertisement" as "a notice that is broadcast or published 
to the general public or specific market segments 
about your goods, products or services for the purpose 
of attracting customers or supporters." 
*1138 In 2008, various entities sued Trailer 
Bridge and other defendants for conspiring to fix 
prices of cabotage services between the United States 
and Puerto Rico in violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. In a section titled "Fraudulent Concealment," the 
underlying antitrust complaint alleges that, between 
2002 and April 2008, the defendants affirmatively 
concealed their unlawful activity. The complaint al-
leges that the defendants met in secret and issued 
materially false public statements about the reasons 
for rate and surcharge increases. As an example, the 
complaint alleges that Trailer Bridge's CEO noted in 
an interview "that customer decisions were driven by 
'[pjrice in an all-inclusive sense, which starts with the 
freight rate,' implying that Defendants could not rig 
bids or set and increase rates, surcharges or fees, and 
therefore were not doing so, or otherwise acting an-
ti-competitively." The complaint asserts that this al-
legedly misleading statement was an attempt to con-
ceal Trailer Bridge's ability to rig bids and effect su-
pra-competitive rates. 
In this case before the district court, Trailer 
Bridge argued that Defendant Illinois National owed a 
duty to defend the antitrust action under the Policy's 
coverage for "personal and advertising injury." Trailer 
Bridge pointed out that the CEO's interview was pub-
lished in The Wall Street Transcript, a newsletter 
targeted at long-term investors. Trailer Bridge argued 
that the interview was an "advertisement" within the 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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meaning of the Policy and that the CEO's statement 
deployed the "advertising idea" of "another" because 
the CEO's misleading justifications for price increases 
must have originated with Trailer Bridge's competitors 
(and alleged co-conspirators). 
Granting summary judgment, the district court 
concluded^1 that Defendant Illinois National had no 
duty to defend Trailer Bridge because (1) the CEO's 
allegedly misleading statement—made in an interview 
aimed at investors and describing general market 
conditions—was not an "advertisement" for the 
company, (2) even if the statement constituted an 
advertisement, the CEO's brief description of market 
conditions did not involve the use of an "advertising 
idea," (3) even if the CEO's statement was an adver-
tising idea, the antitrust complaint failed to allege that 
the advertising idea "belonged to another," and (4) 
even if the antitrust complaint alleged an advertising 
injury under the Policy, the injury did not cause the 
antitrust plaintiffs' damages because the antitrust 
plaintiffs sought relief only for antitrust violations, not 
for misappropriation of an advertising idea.— 
FN1. The district court concluded, and nei-
ther party disputes, that Florida law applies to 
the construction and application of the Poli-
cy. 
FN2. The district court declined to address 
any exclusion in the Policy because it con-
cluded, for purposes of summary judgment, 
that Illinois National had conceded that none 
of the exclusions was applicable. 
£U In this appeal, Trailer Bridge asserts an array 
of arguments on why the district court erred. But the 
arguments all stem from the central issue of whether 
the CEO's statement triggered the duty to defend un-
der the "personal and advertising injury" provision in 
the Policy. After review and oral argument, we con-
clude that the district court did not err in granting 
summary judgment for Illinois National for the rea-
sons set forth in the district court's thorough and 
well-reasoned order, which we adopt as our own. — 
For the *1139 convenience of the reader, we repro-
duce the district court's order as an appendix to this 
opinion. 
FN3. We note that the district court consid-
ered the entirety of the interview given by 
Fed. C 416 
Trailer Bridge's CEO, and not just the part 
thereof referred to in the complaint. Even if 
that were error, see Jones v. Fla. Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n, Inc.. 908 So.2d 435 (Fla.2005). and 
even if we too accepted Trailer Bridge's in-
vitation to consider the entire interview, our 
decision would be unchanged. 
In particular, we agree with the district court's 
rejection of Trailer Bridge's convoluted argument that 
the CEO's statement deployed the advertising idea of 
"another." The Policy defines "advertising injury" as 
an injury arising from "[t]he use of another's adver-
tising idea in your 'advertisement.' " We reject Trailer 
Bridge's contention that the use of a co-defendant's 
(and alleged co-conspirator's) idea—as opposed to the 
idea of a plaintiff in the underlying antitrust ac-
tion—could qualify as an "offense" under the Policy. 
See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 
F.Supp.2d 994, 1003 (S.D.Ind.2011) (rejecting a sim-
ilar argument and noting that research revealed no 
case in which "an underlying complaint for antitrust 
injury triggered an insurer's duty to defend for an 
advertising injury caused by ... 'the use of another's 
advertising idea in your advertisement' "). The un-
derlying plaintiffs sought only antitrust damages; they 
did not seek to impose any legal obligation upon the 
insured to pay them damages "because of ... adver-
tising injury." No facts were alleged in the underlying 
complaint on the basis of which the underlying plain-
tiffs might have recovered damages "because of ... 
advertising injury"; and the underlying plaintiffs could 
not have recovered such damages because the alleg-
edly misappropriated "advertising idea" was not that 
of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather was alleged to 
have been the advertising idea of other parties alto-
gether. 
AFFIRMED.2*1 
FN4. Trailer Bridge's request for certification 
to the Florida Supreme Court is DENIED. 
APPENDIX 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE 
DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVI-
SION 
TRAILER BRIDGE, INC., a Delaware corpora-
tion, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COM-
PANY, an Illinois corporation, Defendant. 
Case No.: 3:09-cv-l 135-J-20MCR 
ORDER 
Before this Court is Plaintiff Trailer Bridge, Inc.'s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Illinois 
National Insurance Company's Duty to Defend (Doc. 
11, filed December 15, 2009); Defendant Illinois Na-
tional Insurance Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff 
Trailer Bridge's Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment (Doc. 21, filed January 25, 2010); and Plaintiff 
Trailer Bridge, Inc.'s Opposition to Defendant Illinois 
National Insurance Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Doc. 25, filed February 4, 2010). 
I. Statement of Facts011 
FN1. This Court's use of the word "facts" is 
solely for purposes of deciding the Motions 
before it. Kelly v. Curtis.lX F.3d 1544, 1546 
(1 lth Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff, Trailer Bridge, Inc. ("Trailer Bridge"), 
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Jacksonville, Florida. Trailer Bridge offers 
integrated freight shipping services between the con-
tinental United States and Puerto Rico. At issue in this 
case is whether its insurer, Illinois National Insurance 
Company ("Illinois National"), has a duty to *1140 
defend or indemnify Trailer Bridge in a separate ac-
tion. 
Illinois National issued Commercial General Li-
ability Policy No. TGL 989-58-40 ("the Policy") to 
Trailer Bridge for the policy period July 1, 2004, to 
July 1,2005. (Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 1, filed November 19, 
2009). Subject to certain conditions, Illinois National 
agreed to pay any damages Trailer Bridge became 
legally obligated to pay because of "personal and 
advertising injury," and defend against any suit seek-
ing those damages. Id. at 12. "Personal and advertising 
injury" is defined by the Policy as: 
injury ... arising out of one or more of the following 
offenses: 
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment; 
b. Malicious prosecution; 
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry 
into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy 
of a room, dwelling or premises that a person 
occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, 
landlord or lessor; 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that slanders or libels a person or or-
ganization or disparages a person's or organiza-
tion's goods, products or services; 
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of 
material that violates a person's right of privacy; 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
"advertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress 
or slogan in your "advertisement"[.] 
Id at 21. 
In 2008, various entities filed class action law-
suits against Trailer Bridge and other parties in dif-
ferent U.S. district courts. The actions shared factual 
questions relating to allegations that Trailer Bridge 
and others conspired to fix prices of cabotage services 
to and from Puerto Rico, in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. On August 13, 2008, the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated and trans-
ferred those cases, along with all related future ac-
tions, to the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Puerto Rico for pre-trial administration. The 
underlying consolidated action is captioned In Re 
Puerto Rican Cabotage Antitrust Litigation, MDL 
Docket No. 3:08-md-1960 (DRD) ("Antitrust Litiga-
tion"). 
On April 29, 2008, through May 7, 2008, Trailer 
Bridge provided Illinois National with copies of the 
initial class action complaints and requested that the 
company provide a defense to the suits. By letter dated 
August 19, 2008, Illinois National notified Trailer 
Bridge that the actions did not implicate coverage 
under the Policy. However, on May 18, 2009, Trailer 
Bridge retendered the individual complaints and the 
consolidated second amended complaint. After re-
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viewing the pleadings, Illinois National again found 
that no coverage existed under the Policy. Thereafter, 
Illinois National also denied a defense to the Antitrust 
Litigation upon receipt of the consolidated third and 
fourth amended complaints. 
On November 19, 2009, Trailer Bridge filed its 
Complaint in this Court for breach of contract and 
declaratory judgment. (Doc. 1). The two-count Com-
plaint asserts that the complaint filed in the Antitrust 
Litigation alleges a personal and advertising injury 
offense, and thus, Illinois National 1) owes Trailer 
Bridge a duty to defend, and 2) breached the insurance 
contract by failing to provide a defense. 
II. Discussion 
Trailer Bridge moved for summary judgment on 
the specific issue of whether Illinois National owes a 
duty to defend in *1141 the Antitrust Litigation. Illi-
nois National submitted its memorandum in opposi-
tion and its cross motion for summary judgment on the 
issues of whether it owes Trailer Bridge a duty to 
defend and whether it has an obligation to indemnify. 
a. Standard of Review 
[2] Summary judgment is proper if, following 
discovery, the pleadings, depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in 
dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Cafrett, All 
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986): 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Further, when the essential facts of 
the case are not in dispute, it is appropriate for a dis-
trict court to interpret an insurance contract to deter-
mine whether any ambiguities exist as a matter of law. 
Gulf Tampa Dry dock Co. v. Great AtL Ins. Co., 757 
F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir.1985). 
b. Choice of Law and Contract Construction 
[3][4] This case is before this Court on diversity 
jurisdiction. In diversity actions, the federal court 
must apply the substantive law of the state in which it 
sits, "except in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by act of Congress." Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 
1188 (1938). Because the insurance contract was 
issued in Florida and the questions before this Court 
are ones of contract construction, it is undisputed that 
Florida law governs the meaning of the Policy and its 
application to the facts of this case. In the absence of 
Fed. C 416 
precedents from Florida's courts, however, the case 
law of other jurisdictions that have examined similar 
policy provisions may be considered to determine the 
issues of state law as this Court believes the Florida 
Supreme Court would. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. 
v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1231 (llthCir.2004). 
[5~11"6] "In insurance coverage cases under Florida 
law, courts look at the insurance policy as a whole and 
give every provision its 'full meaning and operative 
effect.' " State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 393 F.3d at 
1230 (quoting Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir.2002)). 
"[Insurance contracts are construed according to their 
plain meaning. Ambiguities are construed against the 
insurer and in favor of coverage." Taurus Holdings, 
Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 913 So.2d 528, 
532 (Fla.2005). "Although ambiguous provisions are 
construed in favor of coverage, to allow for such a 
construction the provision must actually be ambigu-
ous." Id_ Courts are not permitted to "rewrite con-
tracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise 
reach results contrary to the intentions of the parties." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
c. Duty to Defend 
m m m n o i n n In Florida, "the general rule is 
that an insurance company's duty to defend an insured 
is determined solely from the allegations in the com-
plaint against the insured, not by the true facts of the 
cause of action against the insured, the insured's ver-
sion of the facts or the insured's defenses." State Farm 
Fire and Cas. Co., 393 F.3d at 1230 (citing Amerisure 
Ins. Co. v. Gold Coast Marine Distribs., Inc., Ill 
So.2d 579, 580-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). The insurer 
must provide a defense in the underlying action if the 
complaint states facts that bring the injury within the 
policy's coverage. W "If the complaint alleges facts 
partially within and partially outside the scope of 
coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire 
suit." *1142Lazzara Oil Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 
683 F.Supp. 777, 779 (M.D.Fla.1988). The merits of 
the underlying suit have no bearing on whether the 
duty is owed. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 393 F.3d 
at 1230. "Furthermore, any doubt about the duty to 
defend must be resolved in favor of the insured. 
Coverage is determined from examining the most 
recent amended pleading, not the original pleading." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The parties agree that no material facts are in 
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dispute. Illinois National's duty to defend depends 
entirely on interpretation of the Policy and its appli-
cation to the allegations of the underlying complaint. 
Since these issues are matters of law, this question is 
appropriate for summary judgment. 
The parties filed a Joint Notice to Court (Doc. 43, 
filed June 2, 2010) representing that Trailer Bridge 
was dismissed with prejudice from the Antitrust Lit-
igation on April 30, 2010. Thus, the Fourth Amended 
Class Action Complaint (Doc. S-l, filed May 12, 
2010) ("Antitrust Complaint") is the most recent 
pleading in which Trailer Bridge is named as a party. 
The Antitrust Complaint alleges violations of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 3 .— It claims 
the underlying defendants restricted competition 
through a continuing agreement to allocate customers, 
rig bids, and fix rates, surcharges, and other fees. 
(Doc. S-l at 59-61). The Antitrust Complaint further 
alleges the underlying defendants attempted to con-
ceal their scheme, in part, by making false and mis-
leading public statements about the reasons for rate 
and surcharge increases. Id. at 54-57. As an example, 
it points to a portion of an interview given by Trailer 
Bridge's CEO in 2005. Id at 56. He is quoted as stat-
ing "that customer decisions were driven by '[p]rice in 
an all-inclusive sense, which starts with the freight 
rate[.]'"/</. 
FN2. This Court notes that sections of the 
Antitrust Complaint, which is currently filed 
under seal, are quoted within this Order. See 
Order (Doc. 40, signed April 22, 2010). All 
material discussed or quoted, however, is 
substantially similar to the allegations con-
tained in the complaint filed in the public 
record. See Second Consolidated Amended 
Class Action Complaint (Doc. 1-2, Exhibit 
4, filed November 19, 2009). 
The plaintiffs in the Antitrust Litigation took 
these statements to imply the underlying "Defendants 
could not rig bids or set and increase rates, surcharges 
or fees, and therefore were not doing so[.]" Id. They 
allegedly "lulled [the underlying] Plaintiffs and 
members of the class into believing that the price 
increases were the normal result of competitive mar-
ket forces rather than the product of [the underlying] 
Defendants' anti-competitive efforts." Id. 
Trailer Bridge argues that the above allegations 
against it "potentially evidence 'use of another's ad-
vertising idea in [its] advertisement' so as to fall 
within the potential coverage for offense section" of 
the Policy. (Doc. 11 at 2). It claims an implication of 
market driven pricing constitutes an advertising idea, 
id. at 13, and the Antitrust Complaint indicates the 
idea was already used by its co-defendants in the un-
derlying action, thus making it an idea of another's. Id. 
at lO.1*2 
FN3. Trailer Bridge argues that multiple 
Policy exclusions, including the exclusion 
for injury arising out of criminal acts, do not 
apply in this case. Id. at 19-25; see Doc. 1-1, 
Exhibit 1, at 13. Illinois National fails to 
oppose the arguments, and merely claims 
that this Court need not consider their ap-
plicability at this time. (Doc. 21 at 31). Thus, 
for the purposes of this Motion, Illinois Na-
tional has conceded the issue. 
i. Advertising Injury 
Illinois National takes issue with Trailer Bridge's 
interpretation of the Policy. According to Illinois 
National, the Antitrust *1143 Complaint does not 
allege wrongful acts were committed in Trailer 
Bridge's "advertisement," or that Trailer Bridge used 
"another's advertising idea." Because the Antitrust 
Complaint fails to contain allegations comprising an 
advertising injury offense, it argues coverage is not 
implicated under the Policy.
 0 
The Policy states Illinois National has a duty to 
defend against any cases seeking damages because of 
personal and advertising injury. (Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 1, 
at 12). "Personal and advertising injury" is defined as 
injury arising out of specific, enumerated offenses, 
including "[t]he use of another's advertising idea in 
your 'advertisement^]' " Id. at 21. The Policy defines 
"advertisement" as "a notice that is broadcast or pub-
lished to the general public or specific market seg-
ments about your goods, products or services for the 
purpose of attracting customers or supporters." Id. at 
19. 
[12] The disputed quotation derives from an arti-
cle published by The Wall Street Transcript ("Peri-
odical"). (Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 5, filed November 19, 
2009). The article, based on an interview of Trailer 
Bridge's past CEO, covers multiple topics, ranging 
from what types of assets the company owns and 
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descriptions of its services, to the CEO's general out-
look on the relevant market. While it could conceiva-
bly lead to additional customers or supporters for 
Trailer Bridge, that in no way appears to be the arti-
cle's purpose. Its purpose, instead, seems to be purely 
informational. The Periodical questioned the CEO so 
that it could provide a summary of the company and 
market to its readership. No representation is made 
that Trailer Bridge paid the Periodical to publish the 
article or directed its content in any way. Including 
quotes from Trailer Bridge's CEO, which happen to be 
beneficial to the company, does not transform the 
article into an advertisement of the company's. Not-
withstanding, even if the Antitrust Complaint identi-
fied a relevant advertisement, it still fails to allege 
facts showing use of "another's advertising idea." 
[13] The Policy does not define "advertising 
idea." Yet, the Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law, 
has construed the term to mean "any idea or concept 
related to the promotion of a product to the public." 
Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 
1179. 1188 (11th Cir.2002). Put another way, "[a]n 
advertising idea is a concept about the manner a 
product is promoted to the public." Gemini Ins. Co. v. 
The Andy Boyd Co., Civil Action No. H-05-1861, 
2006 WL 1195639. at *2 (S.D.Tex. May 3, 2006) 
(citing Hyman, 304 F.3dat 1188). 
It is merely asserted that Trailer Bridge made 
misleading statements about the reasons for increased 
prices, specifically, representing "that customer deci-
sions were driven by '[p]rice in an all-inclusive sense, 
which starts with the freight rate.5 " (Doc. S-l at 56). 
No effort was made to differentiate or promote any 
aspect of Trailer Bridge's products or services. In-
stead, the statement provided a brief explanation of the 
factors affecting price in the entire Puerto Rican cab-
otage market. Cf. American Simmental Ass'n v. Core-
gis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.2002) ("The 
plain and ordinary meaning of 'advertising idea' 
generally encompasses an idea for calling public at-
tention to a product or business, especially by pro-
claiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or 
patronage." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Proxima Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 132,1994 
WL 245671 at *1 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished table 
decision) (holding that the shape of a product was not 
an advertising idea because there was no allegation in 
the complaint "that the design itself [was] a trademark, 
or [was] *1144 intended to distinguish the product 
Fed. C 416 
from others that might enter the market." (citation 
omitted)). Regardless of whether the statement lulled 
customers into believing rates were controlled by the 
free market, its purpose does not appear related to 
promoting Trailer Bridge's product. 
[14] Even assuming, however, the explanation 
amounted to an advertising idea, the Antitrust Com-
plaint fails to allege it belonged to another. Under the 
Policy, the advertising idea used must be "another's" 
to meet the definition of the claimed offense. (Doc. 
1-1, Exhibit 1, at 21). According to Trailer Bridge, the 
Antitrust Complaint implies the idea was used by its 
co-conspirators prior to the date of the CEO's inter-
view. (Doc. 11 at 10; Doc. 25 at 9). It argues this, 
paired with the pleading's failure to allege or imply 
Trailer Bridge created the idea, "raise[s] the una-
voidable inference that the subject 'advertising idea' 
originated with an entity other than Trailer Bridge." 
(Doc. 25 at 9). 
[15] Trailer Bridge asks this Court to infer too 
much. "[C]ourts need not stretch the allegations be-
yond reason to impose a duty on the insurer." Hoi-
low ay Sportswear, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 58 
Fed.Appx. 172, 175 (6th Cir.2003). Contrary to 
Trailer Bridge's argument, the broad assertion, "[f]rom 
2002 through April 2008, Defendants ... affirmatively 
and wrongfully concealed their unlawful conducf' 
through "misrepresentations ... concerning the reasons 
for increases in rates, surcharges and other fees[,]" 
does not imply another individual originated or used 
the purported advertising idea prior to Trailer Bridge. 
(Doc. S-l at 54-55; see Doc. 25 at 9). 
[16] As an alternative argument, Trailer Bridge 
contends that airlines routinely cite fuel surcharges as 
an explanation for the increase in their prices, which 
establishes it was another's idea. (Doc. 11 at 10). 
Notwithstanding, courts must look to the underlying 
complaint to determine the duty to defend, not the true 
facts of the cause of action against the insured or the 
insured's version of the facts. State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Co., 393 F.3d at 1230. Just as there is no mention 
of the purported advertising idea belonging to a 
co-conspirator, nowhere in the Antitrust Complaint is 
it implied that the idea was ever used by or belonged to 
an airline. The Antitrust Complaint simply fails to 
allege an advertising idea belonged in any way to 
another entity. 
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Having determined the Antitrust Complaint does 
not contain allegations supporting a qualifying of-
fense, there can be no advertising injury arising 
therefrom. This alone is enough to relieve Illinois 
National of a duty to defend Trailer Bridge under the 
asserted Policy section. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
completeness, this Court will address Illinois Na-
tional's additional arguments. 
ii. Causation 
Illinois National contends that even if the Court 
were to find the Antitrust Complaint contained alle-
gations of an advertising injury, no causal connection 
lies between the damages sought by the underlying 
plaintiffs and an advertising injury. (Doc. 21 at 8,27). 
"It was the inflated costs of [the underlying] defend-
ants' cabotage services, and not the 'cover-up' or 
explanation for the surcharge, which gave rise to the 
underlying plaintiffs' damages." Id. at 8. 
According to Trailer Bridge, though, "[i]t is of no 
moment that the asserted Ocean Shipping Antitrust 
Litigation claims alleged violations of antitrust law." 
(Doc. 11 at 7). All that is required is the Antitrust 
Complaint plead some injury arose out of the "use of 
another's advertising* 1145 idea" offense. Id. at 16. 
This Court must construe the Policy language liberally 
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. 
Id. at 8. To limit coverage to the situations described 
by Illinois National would be to rewrite the contract. 
Id 
[17] The rule that an insurance policy should be 
interpreted liberally in favor of the insured applies 
only when there is more than one reasonable inter-
pretation. See State Farm Fire andCas. Co., 393 F.3d 
at 1230; Taurus Holdings, Inc., 913 So.2d at 532. The 
Policy specifically states Illinois National must pro-
vide a defense only to cases seeking sums that the 
insured would become legally obligated to pay as 
damages "because o f personal and advertising injury. 
(Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 1, at 12). 
[18] The Antitrust Complaint asserts the under-
lying defendants, 
restricted] competition by allocating customers, 
rigging bids, and fixing the prices of rates, sur-
charges and other fees for Puerto Rican cabotage.... 
Defendants' unlawful conduct resulted in artificially 
high, supra-competitive prices charged by De-
fendants and their co-conspirators to Plaintiffs.... 
Plaintiffs and members of the class seek to recover 
three times their overcharge damages plus interest, 
attorneys' fees and costs of litigation. 
(Doc. S-l at 60-61). Thus, it is apparent the un-
derlying plaintiffs allege their injuries were caused by 
higher prices arising from price-fixing, not from the 
use of another's advertising idea in Trailer Bridge's 
advertisement. None of the damages sought by the 
underlying plaintiffs in the Antitrust Complaint are 
payments requested "because o f an advertising in-
jury, but instead were strictly for antitrust injuries. Cf. 
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Riso, Inc., 479 F.3d 158,162 (1st 
Cir.2007) (finding that the insurer did not have a duty 
to defend based, in part, on the fact "the damages to 
the... plaintiffs, if any occurred, were due to the higher 
costs caused by [the defendant's] higher prices, rather 
than any injury to the plaintiffs' reputations"); Nat'l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Alticor, Inc., Nos. 
05-2479. 06-2538. 2007 WL 2733336, at *6 (6th Cir. 
Sept. 19, 2007) ("Because the policies at issue in this 
matter do not purport to cover antitrust injuries, and 
because the damages sought by the [underlying] 
plaintiffs were only for such antitrust injuries, the 
policies issued by the plaintiff-insurers do not apply in 
this instance, and there was no duty to defend."). 
[19] "[T]he theories advanced and labels used in a 
complaint are subordinate to the facts alleged for the 
purpose of determining the duty to defend." Harris 
Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 
96-166-CIV-ORL-19A, 1998 WL 1657171, at *2 
(M.D.Fla. Mar. 19,1998) (citing Lime Tree Vill. Cmty. 
ClubAss'n, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 
1402, 1405-06 (11th Cir.1993)). Therefore, the mere 
inclusion of the term "marketing" within the Antitrust 
Complaint is not enough to bring the claim within the 
Policy's coverage. Cf. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, 2007 WL 2733336, at *6. It appears the 
allegations regarding the purported use of the adver-
tising idea were included simply to exemplify the 
efforts undertaken to hide the price-fixing scheme, an 
antitrust offense, so that the statute of limitations 
could be equitably tolled. (Doc. S-l at 56-57). The 
relationship between the purported advertising injury 
and the damages claimed in the underlying action is 
too remote to say it is seeking damages "because o f 
the injury. This Court finds it very unlikely that the 
insured or the insurer intended coverage for the type of 
conduct alleged in the Antitrust Complaint. 
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*1146 d. Duty to Indemnify 
[20] The above analysis establishes that the alle-
gations in the Antitrust Complaint are not covered by 
the Policy. Thus, Illinois National was not in breach 
for failing to provide a defense and holds no duty to 
indemnify Trailer Bridge. See, e.g., Philadelphia In-
dent. Ins. Co. v. Yachtsman's Inn Condo Ass'n, Inc., 
595 F.Supp.2d 1319. 1322 (S.D.Fla.2009) ("[A] 
court's determination that the insurer has no duty to 
defend requires a finding that there is no duty to in-
demnify."); Fun Spree Vacations, Inc. v. Orion Ins. 
Co., 659 So.2d 419, 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). 
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and AD-
JUDGED: 
1. Plaintiff Trailer Bridge, Inc.'s Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment Re Illinois National Insurance 
Company's Duty to Defend (Doc. 11, filed December 
15, 2009) is DENIED. 
2. Defendant Illinois National Insurance Com-
pany's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21, filed 
January 25, 2010) is GRANTED. 
3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor 
of Defendant that it does not owe a duty to defend or 
indemnify for the underlying action, and CLOSE the 
file. 
4. The Show Cause Order (Doc. 36, signed March 
31,2010) is DISCHARGED. 
DONE AND ENTERED in Jacksonville, Flori-
da, this 21st day of July, 2010. 
/s/ Harvey E. Schlesinger 
HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER 
United States District Judge 
C.A.I l(Fla.),2011. 
Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. 
657 F.3d 1135, 2011-2 Trade Cases P 77,665, 23 Fla. 
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ROSE ACRE FARMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
COLUMBIA CASUALTY CO. and National Fire 
Insurance Co. of Hartford, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 11-1599. 
Argued Sept. 26, 2011. 
Decided Nov. 1,2011. 
Background: Insured egg producer brought action 
against liability insurers, alleging insurers had duty to 
defend it in underlying antitrust litigation. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of In-
diana, Sarah Evans Barker, J., 772 F.Supp.2d 994, 
granted insurers' motions for summary judgment, and 
insured appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Posner, Circuit 
Judge, held that: 
(1) underlying antitrust complaint did not allege injury 
arising out of "use of another's advertising idea" in 
insureds' advertisement, as required for insurer to have 
duty to defend insured under "personal and advertis-
ing injury" provision of liability policy, and 
(2) insurer's duty to defend was precluded by general 
policy provision excluding coverage for "criminal act 
committed by or at the direction of any insured." 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
HI Insurance 217 €^>2298 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIWB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-
ties 
217k2297 Advertising Injury 
217k2298 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under Indiana law, underlying antitrust com-
plaint against insured egg producer, alleging con-
spiracy to fix price of eggs, did not allege injury 
arising out of "use of another's advertising idea" in 
insureds' advertisement, as required for insurer to have 
duty to defend under "personal and advertising injury" 
provision of liability policy; underlying complaint was 
devoid of any reference to any advertisement by in-
sured, complaint did not mention advertising on in-
sured's websites, which provided rationale for price of 
insureds' eggs, and, although complaint alleged that 
insured "marketed" its product, advertising in general 
was irrelevant without allegation that insured used 
advertising idea of another in advertising its product. 
Sherman Act, § 1, 15U.S.C.A. § 1. 
12] Insurance 217 €^>2278(4) 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVIKA) In General 
217k2273 Risks and Losses 
217k2278 Common Exclusions 
217k2278(2) Intentional Acts or In-
juries 
217k2278(4) k. Criminal acts. 
Most Cited Cases 
Under Indiana law, liability insurer's duty to de-
fend insured egg producer in underlying antitrust 
action, alleging insured conspired to fix price of eggs, 
was precluded by general policy provision excluding 
coverage for "criminal act committed by or at the 
direction of any insured," since participation in con-
spiracy to violate federal antitrust law was both de-
liberate and criminal. Sherman Act, §J_y 15U.S.C.A. § I. 
David A. Gauntlett (argued), Attorney, Gauntlett & 
Associates, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Christopher R. Carroll (argued), Attorney, Carroll 
McNulty & Kull, Basking Ridge, NJ, for Defend-
ants-Appellees. 
Before CUDAHY. POSNER, and WOOD, Circuit 
Judges. 
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POSNER, Circuit Judge. 
*1 The plaintiff, Rose Acre, the nation's se-
cond-largest producer of eggs, has along with other 
egg producers been charged in a number of class ac-
tion suits with conspiring to fix the price of eggs, in 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. (It has been 
embroiled in antitrust litigation before, perhaps be-
cause it has been so successful. See A.A. Poultry 
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 
(7th Cir. 1989).) Other violations are charged as well in 
some of the class action suits, but they are similar to 
the Sherman Act violations and need not be discussed 
separately. The class actions were consolidated and 
transferred for pretrial proceedings to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, where they are pending. 
Rose Acre asked its liability insurers to defend it in the 
class action suits, arguing that the complaints sought 
damages for what Rose Acre's policies call "personal 
and advertising injury." As the policies are identical, 
differing only in the coverage period, to simplify this 
opinion we'll pretend there's only one insurer, one 
insurance policy, and, because the antitrust complaints 
do not differ from each other in any respect relevant to 
the appeal, one antitrust complaint. 
The insurer (for remember we're pretending 
there's just one) refused to defend Rose Acre, on the 
ground that the antitrust complaint alleged nothing 
that could be regarded as "personal and advertising 
injury." This suit, a diversity suit governed by Indiana 
law, followed. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the insurer. 
[1] The insurance policy defines "personal and 
advertising injury" as "injury ... arising out of one or 
more of the following offenses," and a list of torts 
follows that includes "the use of another's advertising 
idea in your 'advertisement.' " We'll call this coverage 
"advertising injury." 
Rose Acre tries to connect its advertising to the 
antitrust suit in the following convoluted manner. The 
company belongs to United Egg Producers, Inc., the 
trade association of egg producers. The association 
publishes animal husbandry guidelines, see United 
Egg Producers, Animal Husbandry Guidelines for 
U.S. Egg Laying Flocks (2010 ed.), 
www.uepcertifled.com/media/pdf/UEP-Animal-Wel 
fare-Guidelines.pdf (visited Oct. 5, 2011), and per-
mits producers who comply with its guidelines to 
Cases P 77,666 
market their eggs as "United Egg Producers Certi-
fied." Rose Acre does that, and it also advertises its 
compliance with the guidelines on its website, 
www.roseacre.com/ (visited Sept. 26, 2011), where it 
points out that it sells not only eggs produced by caged 
chickens, but also eggs produced by "free-roaming" 
chickens—chickens that are not caged (they have 
nests in their hen houses but are free to run around) 
and subsist on a vegetarian diet. (See the excerpt from 
the website at the end of this opinion.) 
The website states (along with much 
else—including an answer to the question which came 
first, the chicken or the egg —) that "eggs from the 
'Free-Roaming' farms cost much more than regular 
eggs because the eggs must be gathered by hand from 
the individual hen's nest. All of our chickens are kept 
in a humane and friendly environment. Plenty of fresh 
water, fresh air, and fresh feed are available to each 
chicken at all times, with plenty of space for each 
chicken to move about and socialize with the other 
chickens." www.roseacre.com/eggfaq.html (visited 
Oct. 27, 2011). This statement could be thought in-
tended to throw consumers suspicious of the high 
price of eggs laid by free-roaming chickens off the 
scent, and make them think the high price the result 
not of a conspiracy among egg producers but instead 
of the chickens' healthful and humane living condi-
tions; those conditions increase labor costs (the eggs 
must be gathered by hand) and probably other costs as 
well, since the chickens have more space. 
*2 But that interpretation is not alleged in any of 
the 353 paragraphs of the antitrust complaint. The 
complaint doesn't mention Rose Acre's website, or any 
other advertising on defendants' websites; it doesn't 
quote the passage we quoted from the website about 
eggs from "free-roaming" chickens being more costly. 
It says that "Rose Acre has participated in and profited 
from UEP's and its [presumably the "its" is "Rose 
Acre's"] efforts to reduce supply and fix prices," that 
"Rose Acre has agreed to the conspiracy by selling 
UEP certified eggs," that "UEP Certified companies 
[such as Rose Acre] are permitted to display the UEP 
Certified logo on their packaging and to market their 
eggs as 'United Egg Producers Certified,' " and finally 
that "all UEP Certified eggs must also be marketed 
with the phrase 'Produced in Compliance with the 
United Egg Producers' Animal Husbandry Guide-
lines.' " But the antitrust complaint complains only 
about conspiring to fix the price of eggs from caged 
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chickens, and nowhere does Rose Acre's website state 
that the cost of those eggs is increased by the measures 
taken to make the chickens that lay them healthy and 
happy—though remember that it does say that all its 
chickens have a healthy and friendly environment, so 
perhaps there's a faint implication that all Rose Acre's 
eggs are more expensive than they would be if the 
company did not give more weight to its chickens' 
mobility and social opportunities than to the cost of 
their eggs. 
But this suit would fail even if one could tease out 
of the antitrust complaint a charge that Rose Acre's 
advertising was in furtherance of the alleged antitrust 
conspiracy. Coverage of liability for an "offense" 
defined as "the use of another's advertising idea" in 
one's own advertising cannot extend to using another's 
advertising idea with that other's consent. Suppose 
Rose Acre published on its website the following ad, 
written by its director of marketing: "We are social-
ists, we abhor profits, and we sell all our eggs at cost." 
Although the ad might be thought in furtherance of the 
antitrust conspiracy, any antitrust liability that it cre-
ated would not be "advertising injury" because the 
company's marketing director is not "another." What 
difference could it make if instead the ad had been 
written by Rose Acre's advertising agency? 
Antitrust liability, moreover, is a major business 
risk, especially for one of the largest companies in a 
major market. It is hardly likely that parties to an 
insurance contract would seek to cover such a serious 
risk indirectly through an "advertising injury" provi-
sion aimed at misappropriation and other intellectu-
al-property torts. 
It is a standard provision, as so many provisions 
in insurance policies are; it was drafted by ISO (In-
surance Services Office, Inc.), a coalition of insurance 
companies that among other things drafts standardized 
insurance policies for its members and other insurance 
companies, see "Company Background," 
www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Propert 
y-Casualty-Insurance/Company-Background.html 
(visited Oct. 27, 2011), including liability insurance 
policies. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764, 772, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 
(1993). The provision, which has been approved by 
Indiana's insurance commissioner, replaces an earlier 
provision that defined advertising injury as "misap-
propriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
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business." 4 David A. Gauntlett, New Appleman on 
Insurance Law §§ 30.01(4)(a)(ii)(B)(3HC) (2011); 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 
1226, 1231 n. 2 (11th Cir.2004). Rose Acre points out 
that "use" does not carry the pejorative connotation of 
"misappropriation." True; but the reason for the 
change of wording had nothing to do with Rose Acre's 
argument. The reason was that a conflict had devel-
oped in the courts over whether "misappropriation" 
was used in the policy in its common law sense, which 
does not include trademark infringement, or should be 
read in a broader, layperson's sense. Compare State 
Auto Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Travelers In-
demnity Co., 343 F.3d 249, 255-57 (4th Cir.2003) 
(North Carolina law), with Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v. 
Kemper National Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 802-03 (6th 
Cir.1996) (Michigan law); see also United States Golf 
Ass'n v. St. Andrews Systems, Data-Max, Inc., 749 
F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (3d Cir.1984); 2 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair 
Competition § 10:72, pp. 10-190 to KM 93. To re-
solve the conflict, ISO replaced "misappropriation" 
with "use" and, for good measure, added explicit 
coverage for trademark infringement. Gauntlett, su-
pra, § (4)(a)(ii)(C). 
*3 This history makes clear that coverage is lim-
ited to liability to the "other" whose advertising idea is 
used by the insured without the "other's" permission. 
That is what "misappropriation" is; and the question 
whether as used in an insurance policy it might em-
brace trademark infringement does not alter the un-
derstanding that using someone else's idea with that 
someone's consent is not misappropriation. 
[2] Further more, t he policy does not apply to 
advertising injury that is "caused by or at the direction 
of the insured with the knowledge that the act [trig-
gering liability] would violate the rights of another and 
would inflict 'personal and advertising injury' " or that 
"arisfes] out of a criminal act committed by or at the 
direction of any insured." Participation in a conspiracy 
to violate federal antitrust law is both deliberate and 
criminal, and is thus excluded from coverage by both 
provisions. See Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc. 
v. Transportation Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 640, 642-44 (7th 
Cir.2007); Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan 
Emergency Medical Services, Inc., 43 F.3d 1119,1123 
(7th Cir.1994); Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. 
Chicago Ins. Co., 791 F.Supp. 809, 812 
(N.D.Cal.1992). 
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It is true as noted in the Curtis-Universal opinion 
that if an insured asks its liability insurer to defend a 
suit that alleges conduct that is potentially covered by 
the policy as well as conduct that is not, the insurer 
must defend the entire suit. 43 F.3d at 1122; see also 
Transamerica Ins. Services v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 
1283, 1285 (lndA99l): Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. OSI 
Industries, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 192, 200 (Ind.App.2005); 
Aearo Corp. v. American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 
676 F.Supp.2d 738, 745 (S.D.Ind.2009) (Indiana law). 
But the antitrust suit for which Rose Acre wants a 
defense makes no claim that the policy could be 
thought to cover. 
We note finally that the Eleventh Circuit, in a case 
decided a week before the oral argument in this case, 
rejected an identical claim by a firm represented by 
Rose Acre's counsel in this case. Trailer Bridge, Inc. 
v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 657 F. 3d 1135 ( 
11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED. 
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Rose Acre Farms—Cage Free 
l i - i - i i 
FN* "Answers to 11 Frequently Asked 
Questions about Chickens," 
www.roseacre.com/eggfaq.html (visited 
Sept. 26, 2011): "11. Which came first, the 
chicken or the egg? Answer: According to 
the Bible, the chicken came first. 'And the 
evening and the morning were the fourth day. 
And God said, "Let the waters bring forth 
abundantly the moving creature that hath life, 
and fowl that may fly above the earth in the 
open firmament of heaven." ' Genesis 
1:19-20." 
C.A.7 (Ind.),2011. 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co. 
. . . p.3d — , 2011 WL 5313818 (C.A.7 (Ind.)), 2011-2 
Trade Cases P 77,666 
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